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The Public Health Turn in
Reproductive Rights
Rachel Rebouché*
Abstract
Over the last decade, public health research has
demonstrated the short-term, long-term, and cumulative costs of
delayed or denied abortion care. These costs are imposed on
people who share common characteristics: abortion patients are
predominantly low income and disproportionately people of
color. Public health evidence, by establishing how law
contributes to the scarcity of services and thereby entrenches
health disparities, has vividly highlighted the connections
between abortion access, race, and income. The contemporary
attention to abortion law’s relationship to inequality is no
accident: researchers, lawyers, and advocates have built an
infrastructure for generating credible empirical studies of
abortion restrictions’ effects.
What might surprise even close observers of abortion policy
is how the federal courts, including the Supreme Court, have
cited contemporary public health research. Recent litigation
around the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s requirement
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that patients collect in-person the first drug of a medication
abortion—a two-drug regimen taken over two days—is an
example. The federal district court, in that litigation, drew
heavily from public health research demonstrating the health
consequences of denied or delayed abortion care.
Betting on courts to strike down abortion restrictions,
however, is a risky wager, particularly given the current
ambiguity about how the constitutional standard for evaluating
abortion restrictions applies. This Article shows that abortion
law is moving beyond constitutional litigation and toward
building capacity for delivering remote or virtual care. The
confluence of regulation, funding, and evidence has helped
facilitate both telehealth for abortion and self-managed
abortions, which can extend abortion access despite the
evisceration of constitutional rights.
This Article argues that current developments in abortion
law suggest a way forward that hinges neither on defending nor
abandoning the constitutional right to abortion. Scholars in the
field of reproductive justice have called for a move beyond
constitutional doctrine for a long time. That shift, with its
attention to structural and systemic inequalities, has never
seemed more urgent—or more possible—than it is right now.
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INTRODUCTION
On his first day in office, President Biden signed seventeen
executive orders, several of which addressed two pillars of the
Administration’s agenda: to reduce income inequality and root
out racial discrimination.1 Abortion access relates to both of
those goals, though it is seldom described as an issue of
economic and racial justice in public discourse. The Biden
Administration’s press release on the anniversary of Roe v.
Wade2 nodded toward the connection between abortion access
and health, though the statement did not use the word
“abortion” once.3
The silo of abortion within health and economic policy is the
result of varied and complex factors.4 To name just a few: there
is the tenacity of an adversarial model of abortion rights, pitting
pregnant people against fetal personhood;5 there is a deep

1. These orders address the “converging crises” of “the pandemic,
economic struggles, immigration and diversity issues, and the environment
and climate change.” Michael D. Shear, On Day 1, Biden Moves to Undo
Trump’s Legacy, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2021), https://perma.cc/4U7L-KNSH
(last updated Mar. 5, 2021).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. See Press Release, The White House, Statement from President Biden
and Vice President Harris on the 48th Anniversary of Roe v. Wade (Jan. 22,
2021), https://perma.cc/6P5B-L2CK (“We are deeply committed to making sure
everyone has access to care—including reproductive health care—regardless
of income, race, zip code, health insurance status, or immigration status.”).
4. See Nancy Ehrenreich, The Colonization of the Womb, 43 DUKE L.J.
492, 50405 (1993) (critiquing the medicalization of abortion); Michelle
Oberman, Mothers and Doctors’ Orders: Unmasking the Doctor’s Fiduciary
Role in Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 451, 454–55 (2000)
(discussing the “violation of the legal and ethical norms that govern
doctor-patient relationships” when focusing on the maternal-fetal analysis);
KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 33 (1984)
(discussing physicians’ opinions on medicalizing abortion and the potential for
abuse in its practice); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1199 (1992) (“The idea of the woman in control of her
destiny and her place in society was less prominent in the Roe decision . . . .”).
5. See, e.g., MARY ZIEGLER, ABORTION AND THE LAW IN AMERICA: ROE V.
WADE TO THE PRESENT 1–20 (2020) (discussing the history of the abortion
debate and recent changes). But see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH
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debate about the existence and nature of constitutional
protection for abortion;6 and there is stigma and secrecy
attached to reproductive decision-making, sex, and pregnancy.7
The result is what scholars have called “abortion
exceptionalism” or, as defined by David Cohen and Carole Joffe,
“the idea that abortion is treated uniquely compared to other
medical procedures that are comparable to abortion in
complexity and safety.”8
Barriers to abortion services, however, create serious public
health problems because they entrench economic and racial
inequality. Three-fourths of people who terminate pregnancies
are poor or low-income (as defined by federal poverty levels), and
a majority of those people report their chief reason for ending a
OF ABSOLUTES 45 (1990) (questioning “why it should be a matter of medical
discretion at all”).
6. See, e.g., Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice:
De-Constitutionalizing Abortion Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 1394, 1409–10 (2009)
(questioning the costs and dangers of the right to terminate a pregnancy).
7. See CAROL SANGER, ABOUT ABORTION: TERMINATING PREGNANCY IN
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY AMERICA 47–52, 215–17 (2017) (revealing that the
stigma surrounding abortion often results in patients distancing themselves
from the procedures by using an alias); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body:
A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal
Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 273–74 (1992) (highlighting the stigma and
pathology attached to pregnancy and abortion).
8. DAVID COHEN & CAROLE JOFFE, OBSTACLE COURSE: THE EVERYDAY
STRUGGLE TO GET AN ABORTION IN AMERICA 8 (2020); see Caitlin E. Borgmann,
Abortion Exceptionalism and Undue Burden Preemption, 71 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1047, 1048 (2014) (defining “[a]bortion exceptionalism” as the “tendency
of legislatures and courts to subject abortion to unique, and uniquely
burdensome, rules”); Caroline Mala Corbin, Abortion Distortions, 71 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1175, 1176 (2014) (highlighting that, in abortion jurisprudence,
“the normal doctrine does not apply” and “the rules are different when the
claim involves abortion”); Maya Manian, The Consequences of Abortion
Restrictions for Women’s Healthcare, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1317, 1318–20
(2014) (rejecting the idea that abortion can be isolated from other women’s
healthcare issues); B. Jessie Hill, Essentially Elective: The Law and Ideology
of Restricting Abortion During the COVID-19 Pandemic, 106 VA. L. REV.
ONLINE 99, 99–100 (2020) (discussing the doctrine of abortion exceptionalism
during the suspension of non-essential procedures during the pandemic);
Yvonne Lindgren, The Rhetoric of Choice: Restoring Healthcare to the Abortion
Right, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 385, 404–14 (2012) (tracing the litigation and
legislation that has separated abortion from healthcare); Lori Freedman et al.,
Obstacles to the Integration of Abortion into Obstetrics and Gynecology
Practice, 42 PERSPS. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 146, 146 (2010) (addressing
the segregation of abortion services from other healthcare).

THE PUBLIC HEALTH TURN

1359

pregnancy is an inability to afford the costs of raising a child.9
This should not be not surprising, given the financial insecurity
that marks the lives of an increasing number of people in the
United States.10 Most abortion patients are also people of color.11
That, too, reflects broader disparities: race and income align
because of the effects of institutional and structural racism.12
When people cannot obtain abortion care, they incur social,
financial, and physical costs that are difficult to bear.13 Those
costs have long-term effects that perpetuate cycles of
disadvantage and subordination.14 The COVID-19 pandemic has
amplified those costs as made plain by widespread
unemployment, compounded caregiving responsibilities for
families, and an already overstretched healthcare system.15
9. See GUTTMACHER INST., CHARACTERISTICS OF U.S. ABORTION PATIENTS
2014 AND CHANGES SINCE 2008, at 1 (2016), https://perma.cc/9H2V-3VVY
(PDF) (finding that almost half of abortion patients in 2014 lived below the
federal poverty level and an additional 26 percent were considered low
income); Ushma D. Upadhyay et al., Denial of Abortion Because of Provider
Gestational Age Limits in the United States, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1687,
1689 (2014) (surveying over 3,000 people seeking abortions and finding that
“travel and procedure costs” were the most common reasons for delaying care).
10. See
Jedediah
Britton-Purdy
et
al.,
Building
a
Law-and-Political-Economy Framework: Beyond the Twentieth-Century
Synthesis, 129 YALE L.J. 1784, 1786 (2020) (“In the United States and across
the world, income inequality has returned to the levels of the Gilded Age.”);
Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Inequality in the Long Run, 344 SCIENCE
838, 839 (2014) (identifying the resurgence of income inequality in the United
States beginning in the 1970s); THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 1 (2014) (discussing how “capitalism automatically generates
arbitrary and unsustainable inequalities”).
11. See GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 9, at 1 (“Thirty-nine percent [of
abortion patients] were white, 28% were black, 25% were Hispanic, 6% were
Asian or Pacific Islander, and 3% were of some other race or ethnicity.”).
12.
See Ruqaiijah Yearby, Breaking the Cycle of “Unequal Treatment”
with Health Care Reform: Acknowledging and Addressing the Continuation of
Racial Bias, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1281, 1305–06 (2012) (“[S]tructural bias
measures how non-race based factors, such as economic inequalities, indirectly
affect racial minorities. . . . Those without privilege, such as minorities, who
are disproportionately poor, have limited access to health care because they do
not have health insurance and cannot afford to pay for it.”).
13. See COHEN & JOFFE, supra note 8, at 9 (discussing “the everyday
consequences” surrounding abortion).
14. See id. at 17 (noting that studies have found “that women who are
denied wanted abortions are worse off in almost every aspect of their lives”).
15. See Ruqaiijah Yearby & Seema Mohapatra, Systemic Racism, the
Government’s Pandemic Response, and Racial Inequities in COVID-19, 70
IN

1360

78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1355 (2021)

Public health research has highlighted the consequences of
abortion restrictions for individuals’ and the nation’s health.16
Numerous studies, many generated in the past ten years,
demonstrate the short-term, long-term, and cumulative health
effects of anti-abortion laws.17 This research largely responds to
state laws that target providers and facilities and frequently
lead clinics to shut their doors.18 For example, quantitative and
EMORY L.J. 1419, 1426–28 (2021) (examining systemic racism in employment
and healthcare that leads to higher infections and deaths from COVID-19
among people of color); AMANDA FINS, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR, EFFECTS OF
COVID-19 SHOW US EQUAL PAY IS CRITICAL FOR MOTHERS 1 (May 2020),
https://perma.cc/TC2L-6MWH (PDF) (reporting that although mothers with
children under eighteen are less than 16 percent of the working population,
they constitute a large percentage of essential workers).
16. A classic definition of public health is “the fulfillment of society’s
interest in assuring the conditions in which people can be healthy.” INST. OF
MED., THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 40 (1988). The field of public health is
more nuanced than this definition suggests, but the definition captures that
public health includes the study of large-scale, collective health inequalities
and disparities. For example, Lindsay Wiley argues that public health law
historically focused on universal interventions to improve quality of life and,
to that end, targeted individual behaviors to curb unhealthy practices. Lindsay
F. Wiley, Health Law as Social Justice, 24 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 47,
88– 100 (2014). But the field has changed dramatically since those beginnings
and recent scholarship has focused increasingly on structural and institutional
determinants that drive health disparities. See id. at 101–04 (discussing the
modern conditions that create disparities and suggesting solutions to combat
them). Public health researchers have applied a public health framework to
abortion care, noting that an essential public health service, as defined by the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, is to “[c]onduct research to attain
new insights and innovative solutions to health problems.” Sarah C. M.
Roberts et al., A 21st-Century Public Health Approach to Abortion, 107 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 1878, 1881 (2017).
17. See infra Part II.
18. See, e.g., Caitlin Gerdts et al., Impact of Clinic Closures on Women
Obtaining Abortion Services After Implementation of a Restrictive Law in
Texas, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 857, 857 (2016). Generally, this Article uses the
phrase “abortion restrictions” to mean state regulations, passed ostensibly to
protect patient safety and health, that mandate abortion providers and
facilities comply with rules on admitting privileges, ambulatory surgical space
capacity, or the dimensions of clinical or recovery space, to list a few examples.
Id. These laws—often referred to as the targeted regulation of abortion
providers or TRAP laws—either require more from abortion providers than
other providers offering office-based procedures of similar risk or impose rules
that will be difficult for providers to meet, not because they fail to meet the
relevant standard of care, but because the regulation is unnecessary given the
nature of abortion care. See Bonnie S. Jones et al., State Law Approaches to
Facility Regulation of Abortion and Other Office Interventions, 108 AM. J. PUB.
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qualitative studies have measured the number of miles between
remaining clinics after a legal restriction takes effect, and, in so
doing, trace the ripple effects of increased cost and delay.19
Courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have cited this
research in striking down facility and provider restrictions as
unconstitutional.20
The type of evidence that courts cite has expanded to
include abortion restrictions’ impact on health disparities,
which courts have historically ignored or minimized.21 An
increasing number of courts, however, have looked beyond
individual-level harms to identify health burdens on
populations of patients and to analyze the lived experience of
delayed or denied abortion care.22 American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. FDA (ACOG v. FDA)23
illustrates the broader purposes health research serves.
In that case, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Maryland suspended an FDA policy requiring patients to pick
up the first drug in a medication abortion from a health care
facility for the duration of the COVID-19 pandemic.24
HEALTH 486, 486–87 (2018). Other restrictions, such as waiting periods,
gestational age limits, ultrasound, and counseling requirements, also make
providing care expensive and time-consuming. See Upadhyay et al., supra note
9, at 1692 (concluding that financial support and referral programs must be
strengthened to increase access).
19. See infra Part II.AB.
20. See infra Part I.AB.
21. See infra note 236.
22. See Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. FDA, 472 F. Supp.
3d 183, 210–11 (D. Md. 2020) (discussing both the size of the group of
abortion-seeking patients affected as well as how types of evidence should be
weighed); see also infra Parts I.B, II.A. The use of the term “patients” is a
deliberate though imperfect choice. This Article attempts to avoid, when
possible, describing individuals who seek abortion as “women” to acknowledge
that people who become pregnant do not all identify as women. See Jessica A.
Clarke, They, Them, and Theirs, 132 HARV. L. REV. 894, 954 (2019)
(“Pregnancy is distinct from gender identity. People of all gender identities can
be pregnant.”). The choice to refer to “patients” is also to differentiate
individualized burdens from those incurred by groups with common
characteristics (populations) and from burdens affecting the healthcare
system generally (the public’s health). See infra Part II.BC.
23. 472 F. Supp. 3d 183 (D. Md. 2020).
24. Id. at 232; see Medication Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST. (Feb. 2021),
https://perma.cc/3RVU-K2RQ (reporting that 39 percent of the nation’s
abortions in 2017 were medication abortions).
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Medication abortion is a two-drug regimen taken over
twenty-four to forty-eight hours before ten weeks of pregnancy.25
An immediate effect of the district court’s ruling was to open
new avenues for the remote delivery of abortion care.26 The
district court’s opinion detailed various burdens of in-person
dispensation, starting with the health risks for patients visiting
a clinic in the midst of a pandemic.27 The court held that
in-person collection of a demonstrably safe drug that patients
take at home posed needless risks of COVID-19 exposure and
logistical hurdles.28 Most significantly, the court’s decision
captured a core problem with the law: the FDA’s rule penalizes
people who already live with inadequate resources, and it
exacerbates financial and other stress.29 In short, requiring
in-person collection is irresponsible health policy.
Though the district court relied on extensive evidence and
public health expertise, the Supreme Court was not persuaded
by the same factual record.30 In January 2021, the Court stayed
the district court’s injunction pending appeal.31 Justice
Sotomayor wrote a strong dissent, which relied heavily on the
district court’s findings, calling the FDA’s exceptional treatment
of medication abortion “unnecessary, unjustifiable, irrational”
and the effect of the rule “callous.”32
The Supreme Court’s order, however, did not prove to be a
roadblock in the path forged by ACOG v. FDA. While the case

25. See The Availability and Use of Medication Abortion, KAISER FAM.
FOUND. (June 16, 2021), https://perma.cc/94WD-T3PK (explaining what
medication abortions are).
26. See id. (“[T]he federal district court ruled that the FDA was required
to temporarily suspend the REMS in-person requirement during the pandemic
emergency . . . .”).
27. See infra Part I.C.
28. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 472 F. Supp. 3d at 232.
29. See NAT’L ACADS. SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., ABORTION CARE AND THE SIX
ATTRIBUTES OF QUALITY HEALTH CARE 12 (2018), https://perma.cc/C93PDMSE (PDF) (concluding that abortion restrictions adversely affect the
Institute of Medicine’s six domains of quality of care: safety, effectiveness,
efficiency, patient-centeredness, timeliness, and equity).
30. See FDA v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 141 S. Ct. 578,
578–79 (2021) (per curiam) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (finding the record
insufficient to “compel the FDA to alter the regimen for medical abortion”).
31. Id. at 578 (per curiam opinion).
32. Id. at 579, 583 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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was before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the
FDA suspended the in-person restriction for the life of the
pandemic and announced it will reconsider the regulation of the
first drug in a medication abortion.33 The FDA grounded this
decision in evidence of medication abortion’s safety and the
efficacy of remote care.34
Given the dozens of abortion cases working their way
through the federal courts, judges will apply the constitutional
test for abortion rights—the undue burden standard—for an
unforeseeable (though potentially short) future.35 Public health
evidence invites judges to develop factual records that account for
the burdens on patients’ health and lives.36 To be sure, Chief
Justice Roberts’s doctrinal formulation of the undue burden
standard in the recent abortion case, June Medical Services v.
Russo,37 discounts whether an abortion restriction actually
protects patient safety and defers to a state’s reasons for passing
a law.38 Yet even the Chief Justice’s formulation of the undue

33. See Motion for a 30-Day Extension of the Briefing Schedule and
Postponement of Oral Argument at 2, Am. Coll. of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists v. FDA, No. 20-1970 (4th Cir. Mar. 29, 2021) (requesting an
extension to “allow new federal government officials to assess the issues in this
case”); Joint Motion to Stay Case Pending Agency Review at 2, Chelius v.
Becerra, No. 1:17-cv-00493 (D. Haw. May 7, 2021), ECF No. 148 (announcing
the FDA’s intention to review the safety restrictions on medication abortion).
34. Letter from Janet Woodcock, M.D., Acting Comm’r of Food & Drugs,
to Maureen G. Phipps, M.D., Chief Exec. Officer, Am. Coll. of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists and William Grobman, M.D., President, Soc’y for
Maternal-Fetal Med. (Apr. 12, 2021), https://perma.cc/XGL5-X786 (PDF)
(citing studies that “do not appear to show increases in serious safety
concerns . . . occurring with medical abortion as a result of modifying the
in-person dispensing requirement during the COVID-19 pandemic”).
35. The Supreme Court might well strip constitutional protection from
abortion. With the appointment of Justice Barrett, there are now six justices
on the Supreme Court who appear willing to abandon constitutional
protections for abortion rights. See infra Part III.A. On May 17, 2021, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health
Organization, 141 S. Ct. 2619 (2021), taking up the question of whether all
pre-viability prohibitions on elective abortions are unconstitutional. Id. at
2619–20.
36. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2310
(2016) (explaining that, when provided with factual findings, the Court retains
the ability to establish its own interpretation).
37. 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020).
38. See infra Part I.B.
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burden test does not entirely abandon an assessment of whether
a restriction imposes significant obstacles to services.39
As the ACOG case illustrates, lower courts have begun to
cite evidence demonstrating the relationship between
inaccessible abortion and the country’s health disparities.40 But
drawing connections between law and health outcomes requires
an understanding of the many ways that law entrenches
inequality. This Article shows that the reasoning in ACOG
draws on the social determinants of health—improving the
conditions under which people live, work, and learn41—and
emphasizes abortion’s role in the health ecosystem. Indeed,
framing abortion access as a public health issue, rather than
only a right, becomes all the more pressing if the United States
lacks a federal constitutional right to abortion, which could
become a reality in 2022.42
A social-determinants framing invites on-the-ground
interventions as well as federal and state policies that open
avenues to care.43 ACOG v. FDA underscores that people need
not (and often do not) depend on traditional means of obtaining
abortion services.44 After the district court’s decision in July
2020, providers and advocates mobilized quickly, as many
sectors of the healthcare industry did, to provide care through
telehealth.45 By June 2021, telemedicine for abortion was

39. See June Med. Servs. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2135 (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring) (setting out the factors that should be assessed in applying the
Court’s abortion jurisprudence).
40. See Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. FDA, 472 F. Supp.
3d 183, 214–15 (D. Md. 2020) (discussing the impact of restricting abortions
for disadvantaged social groups).
41. See WHO, A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION ON THE SOCIAL
DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH 6 (2010), https://perma.cc/NY5P-SMM2 (PDF)
(defining the “social determinants of health inequities”).
42. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
43. See Britton-Purdy et al., supra note 10, at 1790 (“[In constitutional
law,] questions of coercion and legitimacy remain central but are delimited to
exclude economic power and other structural forms of inequality. Scrutiny in
these fields tends to be restricted to narrowly defined differential treatment of
individuals, especially by the state.”).
44. See Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 472 F. Supp. 3d at 197
(discussing telehealth and alternative abortion options).
45. See The Availability and Use of Medication Abortion, supra note 25
(noting the use of telehealth to increase healthcare access in the pandemic).
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offered in twenty-one states.46 Permitting healthcare providers
to administer care remotely or pregnant people to
self-administer abortion with minimal professional intervention
has changed the map of abortion access in ways that will outlast
the pandemic.
The contribution of this Article is to highlight the role of
public health research in shaping the future of abortion access
and the role of abortion law in contributing to health disparities
and inequalities.47 It shows that strengthening the legal and
practical infrastructure for teleabortion and self-managed care
can respond to the challenges of navigating a country with
divided and regionally-concentrated legal permission for
abortion.
This Article is organized in three Parts. The first Part
analyzes how recent court decisions have changed the undue
burden test while relying on public health research. The second
Part offers examples of public health research concerning
abortion restrictions’ effect on patients, populations, and the
public at large, with the latter reflecting on how the pandemic
has influenced the reception of that evidence. The last Part
considers two scenarios—courts’ application of a narrow undue
burden test and the disappearance of constitutional abortion
rights altogether. In conclusion, this Article explores the public
health community’s support for teleabortion and, to a different
extent, self-managed abortion, which depends less on
constitutional arguments and more on policy innovation, social
movements, and political leadership.

46. The Kaiser Family Foundation reports, as of June 2021, that in
twenty-two states and Washington, D.C. “the telehealth protocol could be used
to provide medication abortion.” Amrutha Ramaswamy et al., Medication
Abortion and Telemedicine: Innovations and Barriers During the COVID-19
Emergency, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (June 16, 2021), https://perma.cc/8QN9ZKB2.
47. Health justice is a framework that scholars have employed to
advocate for “legal protections, financial supports, and accommodations” that
can address health inequalities and reduce health disparities. Emily A. Benfer
et al., Health Justice Strategies to Combat the Pandemic: Eliminating
Discrimination, Poverty, and Health Disparities During and After COVID-19,
19 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 122, 138 (2020). Although scholarship on
health justice has not engaged with the issue of abortion, one goal of this
Article is to put movements for health justice and reproductive justice in
conversation with each other.
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I.

THE EVIDENCE OF UNDUE BURDENS

The Supreme Court’s 2020 decision, June Medical Services
v. Russo, has sparked a debate among lower courts about how to
apply the undue burden standard established in Planned
Parenthood of Southeast Pennsylvania v. Casey.48 Some courts
have applied the balancing test described in Whole Woman’s
Health v. Hellerstedt,49 which weighs the benefits a law confers
against the burdens it imposes on a person’s access to abortion.50
Other courts have applied Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence
in June Medical Services, which ignores abortion restrictions’
benefits and focuses on the “substantial obstacles” erected by
law.51
This Part describes the Court’s application of the undue
burden test in Whole Woman’s Health and June Medical
Services, concentrating on the role that patient-based and
population-based burdens play in both opinions. Although Chief
Justice Roberts’s concurrence in June Medical Services portends
a narrow application of the undue burden test, his opinion
nonetheless recognized the distances that patients would have
to travel as well as the various difficulties that come with travel,
such as arranging transportation and child care.52 This Part
concludes by analyzing the use of health evidence in ACOG v.
FDA, in which a district court applied the version of the undue
burden test established in Whole Woman’s Health, but more
48. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
49. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
50. See, e.g., Falls Church Med. Ctr., LLC v. Oliver, 412 F. Supp. 3d 668,
685 (E.D. Va. 2019) (following the Hellerstedt test). The roots of the balancing
test described herein are in a case penned by Judge Posner on the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. See Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van
Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 798 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The feebler the medical grounds,
the likelier the burden, even if slight, to be ‘undue’ in the sense of
disproportionate or gratuitous.”).
51. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Jegley, 968 F.3d 912, 916 (8th Cir. 2020)
(remanding “for reconsideration in light of Chief Justice Roberts’s separate
opinion in June Medical, which is controlling”); EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr.,
P.S.C. v. Friedlander, 978 F.3d 418, 433–34 (6th Cir. 2020) (upholding a
hospital transfer-agreement requirement “[u]nder the Chief Justice’s
controlling opinion”).
52. See June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2140 (2020)
(Roberts, C.J., concurring) (discussing the burdens identified by the district
court’s findings).
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broadly described the health burdens for patients, populations,
and the public.
A.

Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt

Laws regulating the delivery of abortion services have a life
almost as long as Roe v. Wade,53 the case that established a
constitutional right to abortion.54 But the Court’s scrutiny of
abortion restrictions has changed as the test for
constitutionality has evolved. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
the Court preserved constitutional protection for abortion, but
rejected the trimester framework set out in Roe, according states
greater discretion to restrict access to abortion.55 A plurality of
the Court held in Casey that states could restrict abortion before
viability so long as “a state regulation [does not have] the
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of
a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”56
The Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Carhart57 captured the
stakes of marshaling evidence to establish a law’s burdens. In
Carhart, the Court upheld a federal law, the Partial Birth
53. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
54. In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that criminal laws banning
abortion were an infringement of a constitutional right to privacy. Roe, 410
U.S. at 164. Patients, in consultation with their physicians, could elect to have
an abortion for any reason during the first trimester. Id. In the second
trimester, a state could “regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are
reasonably related to maternal health.” Id. In the third trimester, a state could
“regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in
appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother.” Id. at 164–65. In 1983, for example, the Supreme Court reviewed and
struck down the City of Akron’s requirement that all second-trimester
abortions occur in a hospital because of the obstacles to services the law
erected. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,
451–52 (1983) (“Because [the statute] fails to give a physician ‘fair notice that
his contemplated conduct is forbidden,’ we agree that it violates the Due
Process Clause.” (internal citation omitted)).
55. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 873. The Court held that the state has an
interest in protecting “the health of the woman and the life of the fetus”
throughout a woman’s pregnancy. Id. at 846. Pre-viability, the state has an
interest in potential life and women’s health, so long as restrictions do not
impose an undue burden on the right to abortion. Id. After viability, the state
could proscribe abortion except when pregnancy threatened “the life or health
of the mother.” Id. at 872.
56. Id. at 877.
57. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
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Abortion Ban Act,58 that barred physicians from using a
particular procedure, intact dilation and extraction.59 The law
made no exception for the procedure’s use if indicated for a
patient’s health.60 Relevant to this discussion, the Court
deferred to legislative findings about the nature of and need for
the procedure, stating that “wide discretion” was warranted in
“areas where there is medical and scientific uncertainty.”61
Carhart signaled the Court’s willingness to defer to legislators
even when the legislature offered scant or contradictory
evidence of its claims.62 And, specifically, the case underscored
the heightened stakes of providing evidence on a law’s effects for
patient health.63
Almost a decade later, the Court scaled back deference to
states and clarified the application of the undue burden test.64
58. 18 U.S.C. § 1531.
59. See Carhart, 550 U.S. at 167–68 (finding that the respondents had
“not demonstrated that the Act would be unconstitutional in a large fraction
of relevant cases”).
60. The Court emphasized “documented medical disagreement [about]
whether the Act’s prohibition would ever impose significant health risks on
women.” Id. at 162.
61. Id. at 163.
62.
Justice Kennedy wrote, “While we find no reliable data to measure
the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to
regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained.” Id.
at 159.
63. See ZIEGLER, supra note 5, at 169–70 (explaining how, in reaction to
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Gonzales v. Carhart, research-oriented hubs
formed and built off the work of the Guttmacher Institute).
64. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2312
(2016) (finding that the statute’s admitting privileges requirement was a
substantial obstacle); see also SANGER, supra note 7, at 235–37 (“[T]he Court
explained why Texas cannot make patient care worse for women seeking
abortions in the name of unproven claims about how it is making things
better.”); Leah M. Litman, Dignity and Civility, Reconsidered, 70 HASTINGS
L.J. 1225, 1231 (2019) (“Whole Woman’s Health later pointedly recognized that
courts and legislatures cannot offer unsupported speculation as a basis for
upholding a law that restricts in abortion.”); Leah M. Litman, Unduly
Burdening Women’s Health: How Lower Courts Are Undermining Whole
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 116 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 50, 57 (2017)
[hereinafter, Litman, Unduly Burdening Women’s Health] (explaining how
Whole Woman’s Health clarified and redirected courts’ application of Carhart’s
holding); Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, The Difference A Whole Woman
Makes: Protection for the Abortion Right after Whole Woman’s Health, 126
YALE L.J. F. 149, 161 (2016) (“In identifying the burdens imposed by the Texas
law, the Court describes how enforcing the law would transform women’s

THE PUBLIC HEALTH TURN

1369

In 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down Texas’s House Bill
2 (H.B. 2), which required abortion providers to obtain
admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of their
practice and mandated that abortion clinics be outfitted as
ambulatory surgical centers.65 In applying Casey’s undue
burden standard, the Court assessed and then balanced the
purported benefits of the law against the burdens it imposed.66
The Court held that H.B. 2 did nothing to protect patient health;
instead, by forcing clinics to close, the law threatened patients’
wellbeing.67
Balancing benefits against burdens allowed the Court to
assess patients’ lived experience of gaining access to abortion
services.68 In that vein, the Court turned to public health
expertise and common sense.69 Implementation of the law
shuttered nineteen facilities, leaving around twenty facilities to

experience of abortion, and treats these changes in the conditions of access as
constitutionally cognizable harms to women.”); Mary Ziegler, Substantial
Uncertainty: Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt and the Future of Abortion
Law, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 78 (2016) (“Whole Woman’s Health . . . put teeth
in the undue-burden test first announced in Planned Parenthood v Casey.”).
65. TRAP laws have been on some states’ books for decades, but different
types of TRAP laws have proliferated along with the general uptick of abortion
regulations. For example, from 2011 through 2017, states enacted 401 abortion
restrictions. Elizabeth Nash et al., Policy Trends in the States, 2017,
GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 2, 2018), https://perma.cc/YK99-C6VX. Those seven
years accounted for 34 percent of the total number of restrictions enacted since
Roe v. Wade was decided in 1973. Id.
66. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 900–01
(1992).
67. See Cary Franklin, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt and What
It Means to Protect Women, in REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND JUSTICE STORIES 241
(Melissa Murray et al. eds., 2019) (analyzing the repercussions of H.B. 2 on
abortion-seeking patients and the Court’s application of Planned Parenthood
v. Casey).
68. See Daniel Grossman, The Use of Public Health Evidence in Whole
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 177 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 155, 156 (2016)
(explaining the obstacles women seeking an abortion faced); see Litman,
Unduly Burdening Women’s Health, supra note 64, at 56 (“Hellerstedt rejected
Texas’s argument that courts could not consider evidence that a plaintiff
offered to challenge an abortion restriction . . . .”).
69. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2311
(2016) (relying on peer reviewed studies and expert testimony to conclude that
Texas’s abortion law did not solve any significant health-related problems).
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serve 5.4 million people of reproductive age.70 Thousands of
residents would have lived 150 or 200 miles away from the
nearest abortion provider.71 The Court cited evidence that clinic
closures would mean “fewer doctors, longer waiting times, and
increased crowding.”72 The clinics remaining open, the Court
held, could not have met increased demand, resulting in wait
times for appointments, diminished quality of care, and
increased need for second-trimester abortions.73 “[T]hose
increases are but one additional burden, which, when taken
together with others that the closings brought about, and when
viewed in light of the virtual absence of any health benefit,” led
the Court to conclude that the admitting-privileges requirement
was an unconstitutional undue burden.74
The Court relied on “direct testimony as well as plausible
inferences to be drawn from the timing of the clinic closures.”75
In terms of health expertise, the Court referred to the district
court’s evidentiary record, which “contain[ed] charts and oral
testimony by Dr. Grossman” on how H.B. 2 would strain
access.76 Dr. Daniel Grossman is a professor and OB/GYN who
has been a contributor to the public health research described
in Part II.77 The Court explained:
Dr. Grossman’s opinion rested upon his participation, along
with other university researchers, in research that tracked

70. See id. at 2312 (“Eight abortion clinics closed in the months leading
up to the requirement’s effective date. . . . Eleven more closed on the day the
admitting-privileges requirement took effect.”).
71. See id. at 2313 (“[A]fter the admitting-privileges provision went into
effect, the number of women of reproductive age living in a county . . . more
than 150 miles from a provider increased from approximately 86,000 to
400,000 . . . .” (first omission in original) (internal quotation omitted)).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 2318; see Gerdts et al., supra note 18, at 863 (finding that
closing abortion clinics can result in longer travel times and longer wait times,
potentially inhibiting women from seeking abortion care).
74. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2313.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 2316. In his dissent, Justice Alito disputed the testimony of Dr.
Grossman and the data on the availability of clinic services; he disagreed that
clinics, under the law, would be stretched past capacity and that H.B. 2 caused
various clinics to close. Id. at 2346 n.21 (Alito, J., dissenting).
77. Daniel Grossman, UCSF OBGYN&RS ZUCKERBERG S.F. GEN.,
https://perma.cc/83E3-VHD9.
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“the number of open facilities providing abortion care in the
state by . . . requesting information from the Texas
Department of State Health Services . . . [t]hrough
interviews with clinic staff[,] and review of publicly available
information.”78

In addition to expert testimony and studies generated by
university-based researchers, the Court opined that “common
sense suggests that, more often than not, a physical facility that
satisfies a certain physical demand will not be able to meet five
times that demand without expanding or otherwise incurring
significant costs.”79 Justice Breyer, writing for the majority,
reasoned by analogy:
Suppose that we know only that a certain grocery store
serves 200 customers per week, that a certain apartment
building provides apartments for 200 families, that a certain
train station welcomes 200 trains per day. While it is
conceivable that the store, the apartment building, or the
train station could just as easily provide for 1,000 customers,
families, or trains at no significant additional cost, crowding,
or delay, most of us would find this possibility highly
improbable. The dissent takes issue with this general,
intuitive point by arguing that many places operate below
capacity and that in any event, facilities could simply hire
additional providers. We disagree that, according to common
sense, medical facilities, well known for their wait times,
operate below capacity as a general matter. . . . Healthcare
facilities and medical professionals are not fungible
commodities. Surgical centers attempting to accommodate
sudden, vastly increased demand, may find that quality of
care declines.80

The Court then expressed concern that a decreased quality of
care, as well as the logistical difficulties of obtaining services,
would fall hardest on “poor, rural, or disadvantaged women.”81
Perhaps the Court did not need to rely on “common sense”;
public health research had documented how many people would
be turned away from the remaining clinics, were the Texas law
78. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2316–17 (majority opinion)
(omissions in original) (internal citation omitted).
79. Id. at 2317.
80. Id. at 2317–18 (internal citations omitted).
81. Id. at 2302 (internal quotation omitted).
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to take full effect, and what distances people would have to
travel to reach an open facility.82 The invocation of common
sense suggests that laws’ effects on health services are the
subject of speculative intuition instead of measurable
evidence.83 In June Medical Services, decided by the Supreme
Court after Whole Women’s Health, both the plurality opinion
and concurrence rely less on “common sense” and refer instead
to evidence of the consequences of clinic closures.84
B.

June Medical Services v. Russo

Shortly after the Court handed down Whole Woman’s
Health, the United States District Court of the Middle District
of Louisiana struck down a nearly identical admitting-privileges
requirement in the Louisiana Unsafe Abortion Protection Act
(Act 620).85 The district court held that Act 620 “would do little
or nothing for women’s health, but rather would create
impediments to abortion, with especially high barriers set before
poor, rural, and disadvantaged women.”86 Only one physician
82. See id. at 2317; infra Part II.A.
83. Note the contestation by the state that the evidence offered by
petitioners was accurate; for example, in June Medical Services, Louisiana
argued—and the Fifth Circuit agreed—that providers could comply with the
privileges requirement but “sat on their hands,” and thus clinic closures were
the fault of providers and not the law. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 905 F.3d
787, 807 (5th Cir. 2018).
84. See June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2129–30 (2020)
(acknowledging that closures of abortion clinics would result in longer wait
times, longer travel times, and a greater financial burden on poor women); id.
at 2140 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (deferring to the district court’s findings
that Louisiana’s abortion law would be “particularly burdensome for women
living in northern Louisiana . . . who once could access a clinic in their own
area [and] will now have to travel approximately 320 miles to New Orleans”
(internal quotation omitted)).
85. See June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d 27, 88 (M.D.
La. 2017) (finding that Louisiana’s abortion law imposes an undue burden on
women seeking an abortion).
86. Id. at 84. Cary Franklin notes the immediate impact of Whole
Woman’s Health on the district court’s injunction of Act 620:
[T]he class-related evidence the Louisiana court had previously
refused to consider formed the centerpiece of its analysis. The court
wrote extensively about the hardships that closing clinics would
impose on low-income Louisianans, noting among other things that
“[w]omen who cannot afford to pay the costs associated with travel,
childcare, and time off from work may have to make sacrifices in
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would have remained in practice, reducing the overall capacity
to perform abortions in the state by up to 70 percent and
rendering abortion services inaccessible to many pregnant
people in Louisiana.87
Building a record based on the testimony and research of
health experts, the district court determined that the minimal
benefits of Act 620 were outweighed by the burdens caused by
the legislation.88 Similar to the findings in Whole Woman’s
Health, clinic closures would lead to longer driving and waiting
times at the sole remaining facility.89 The district court
concluded that many Louisiana patients would “face irreparable
harms from the burdens associated with increased travel
distances,”90 including delays in treatment and the increased
risk of “self-performed, unlicensed and unsafe abortions.”91
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed,
because the plaintiffs failed to prove “that a ‘large fraction’ of
women of reproductive age in Louisiana [would] have a
substantial obstacle to an abortion placed in their paths as a
result of the challenged law.”92 The Fifth Circuit also disputed
other areas like food or rent expenses, rely on predatory lenders, or
borrow money from family members of abusive partners or
ex-partners, sacrificing their financial and personal security.”
Cary Franklin, The New Class Blindness, 128 YALE L.J. 2, 80–81 (2018)
(alteration in original) (quoting June Med. Servs. v. Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d
at 83).
87. June Med. Servs. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2115–16. The district court
compared the number of patients that could receive an abortion before and
after Act 620 took effect: abortion would be unavailable to 55 percent of people
seeking an abortion. Id. at 2116. Four of the six physicians named in this
suit—Doe 1, 2, 4, and 6—would have been unable to obtain admitting
privileges and therefore would not have been able to perform abortions. Id. at
2115. A fifth physician, Doe 3, testified that he would retire if the Act took
effect due to fears for his safety. Id. Louisiana would be left with only one
provider and one clinic that could provide abortions. Id.
88. See June Med. Servs. v. Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 88–89 (“The Act
would create substantial obstacles for women seeking abortion in Louisiana
without providing any demonstrated benefit to women’s health or safety.”).
89. See id. at 87–88 (detailing the burdens the Act imposed).
90. Id. at 89.
91. Id. at 88.
92. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Kliebert, 158 F. Supp. 3d 473, 527 (M.D.
La. 2016). In Casey, the state sought to preserve a spousal notification
requirement by arguing that only 1 percent of patients would be affected
because only 20 percent were married and 95 percent notify spouses in any
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the effects of the law, holding that there is “[n]o evidence that
Louisiana facilities will close from Act 620 . . . [and] an
insufficient basis in the record to conclude that the law has
prevented most of the doctors from gaining admitting
privileges.”93
The U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in June Medical Services
was a highly-anticipated statement about the stability of the
Whole Woman’s Health balancing test and of abortion rights
generally.94 Justice Kavanaugh had replaced Justice Kennedy,
who was one of five votes striking down H.B. 2 in Whole
Woman’s Health.95 In a plurality decision, five members of the
Court—including Chief Justice John Roberts, who dissented in
Whole Woman’s Health—held that the Louisiana statute was
unconstitutional.96 Rather than deferring to Louisiana’s stated
interest of protecting patient safety, five Justices agreed that
the obstacles imposed by Act 620 were significant and created
an undue burden on the right to abortion.97

case. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 894 (1992). The
Casey plurality held that the relevant group of patients was “those whose
conduct [the law] affects” and the spousal-notification requirement would
enact a substantial obstacle “in a large fraction of cases in which [the law] is
relevant.” Id. at 89495. A law “must be judged by reference to those for whom
it is an actual rather than an irrelevant restriction.” Id. at 895. Since Casey,
courts have applied the “large fraction” language in divergent ways. See
Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 64, at 154.
93. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 905 F.3d 787, 810–11 (5th Cir. 2018);
see id. at 807 (“[T]here is insufficient evidence to conclude that, had the doctors
put forth a good-faith effort to comply with Act 620, they would have been able
to obtain privileges. Instead . . . [they] sat on their hands, assuming that they
would not qualify. Their inaction severs the chain of causation.” (emphasis
added)).
94. See Laurie Sobel & Alina Salganicoff, Abortion Back at the Supreme
Court: June Medical Services LLC v. Russo, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (June 29,
2020), https://perma.cc/AK9Y-GV6N (“No matter how the Court rules, the
decision will have far reaching impact . . . potentially determining how far
other states can go in limiting access to abortion services.”).
95. See Pete Williams, New Justice on the Bench: Kavanaugh’s First
Supreme Court Cases, NBC NEWS (Oct. 8, 2018, 12:11 PM),
https://perma.cc/6YCC-EKYL.
96. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2113 (2020).
97. See id. (“Given the facts found, we must also uphold the District
Court’s related factual and legal determinations. These include its
determination that Louisiana’s law poses a ‘substantial obstacle’ to women
seeking an abortion . . . .”). Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justices
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Justice Breyer penned an opinion joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, which reiterated that
residents in the northern part of Louisiana would have to travel
over 300 miles to reach the state’s sole provider.98 Moreover, the
state’s requirement of an ultrasound and counseling session
twenty-four hours before an abortion meant that many patients
would either have to make two trips or pay for overnight
accommodation.99 Limiting the availability of services and
increasing the distance between providers would result in
“longer waiting times, and increased crowding.”100 Justice
Breyer concluded, in agreement with “experts and
laypersons . . . that the burdens of increased travel to distant
clinics would fall disproportionately on poor women, who are
least able to absorb them.”101 Notably, Justice Breyer’s opinion

Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh dissented. Id. at 2142–82
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
98. See id. at 2130 (discussing the potential necessity for a patient to
drive from Shreveport to New Orleans because of the law, a distance of over
300 miles). Louisiana also asked the Court to decide whether abortion
providers had third-party standing to bring constitutional challenges. See
Brief for the Respondent/Cross Petitioner at 48–53, June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v.
Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020) (Nos. 18-1323, 18-1460), 2019 WL 7372920
(arguing for the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for a lack of third-party
standing). The Court recognized standing for abortion providers in Singleton
v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976), and applied that case, citing stare decisis. See
June Med. Servs. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2117–20 (majority opinion) (“We have
long permitted abortion providers to invoke the rights of their actual or
potential patients in challenges to abortion-related regulations.”). Dissenting
Justices mounted attacks on Singleton v. Wulff as unsettled and unconvincing
precedent. See id. at 2147–48 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that Singleton
was decided on very narrow grounds, with facts inapplicable to June Medical
Services); id. at 2170 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court’s
jurisprudence on standing has changed since Singleton).
99. June Med. Servs. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2130 (majority opinion).
100. Id. at 2130 (quoting Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct.
2292, 2298 (2016)).
101. Id. at 2130. Although June Medical Services made no mention of race,
as noted below, people of color comprise two-thirds of abortion patients in
Louisiana. See Brief Amici Curiae for Organizations and Individuals
Dedicated to the Fight for Reproductive Justice—Women with a Vision et
al.— in Support of Petitioners at 23–24, June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140
S. Ct. 2103 (2020) (Nos. 18-1323, 18-1460), 2019 WL 6727087. The role of
gender inequality passed unmentioned. See infra Part II.C.
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de-emphasized the “common sense” of supply and demand that
was prominent in Whole Woman’s Health.102
Because the Court struck down an almost identical law in
Whole Woman’s Health, Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence
emphasized respect for stare decisis.103 He wrote separately to
dispute Justice Breyer’s application of the undue burden test.104
Per the Chief Justice’s opinion, under Casey, the Court did not
need to consider whether a law conferred any health benefits;
the only question to answer was whether a law erects a
“substantial obstacle” to services.105 Chief Justice Roberts’s
approach abandons a balancing test of the law’s benefits
(protecting patient safety, for example) against the burdens
imposed.106
Although the Chief Justice was the fifth vote invalidating
the Louisiana law, his concurrence neither shields
constitutional abortion rights from future attacks, nor signals a
willingness to strike down other abortion restrictions under

102. See June Med. Servs. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2131–32 (relying on
expert and lay testimony to decide that the district court’s factual findings
were not clearly erroneous).
103. For a discussion of the treatment of stare decisis in June Medical
Services, see Melissa Murray, The Symbiosis of Abortion and Precedent, 134
HARV. L. REV. 308, 322–27 (2020).
104. See June Med. Servs. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2136 (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring) (stating that the Court, while assessing an abortion regulation,
should focus on the presence of substantial obstacles rather than weighing its
costs and benefits).
105. See id.
Nothing about Casey suggested that a weighing of costs and
benefits of an abortion regulation was a job for the courts. On the
contrary, we have explained that the “traditional rule” that “state
and federal legislatures [have] wide discretion to pass legislation in
areas where there is medical and scientific uncertainty” is
“consistent with Casey.” Casey instead focuses on the existence of a
substantial obstacle, the sort of inquiry familiar to judges across a
variety of contexts. (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163
(2007)).
106. See id. (stating that objectively weighing the “the State’s interests in
protecting the potentiality of human life and the health of the
woman . . . against the woman’s liberty interest in defining her own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life” is
implausible (internal quotations omitted)).
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different facts.107 Yet the Chief Justice’s concurrence accepted the
district court’s depiction of what the landscape of abortion care
would look like if the law had taken effect.108 Despite his
allegiance to precedent and his ambivalence about assessing the
law’s ostensible benefits, his concurrence considered the law’s
operation in the real world.109 As Justice Breyer cited evidence
of the financial, social, and practical burdens of delayed or
denied abortion care, Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged
evidence-based claims that clinic closures lead to increased
burdens for pregnant people:
The [district] court found that Louisiana women already
“have difficulty affording or arranging for transportation and
childcare on the days of their clinic visits” and that
“[i]ncreased travel distance” would exacerbate this difficulty.
The law would prove “particularly burdensome for women
living in northern Louisiana . . . who once could access a
clinic in their own area [and] will now have to travel
approximately 320 miles to New Orleans.”110

As Melissa Murray has demonstrated, this passage responds to
the dissents penned by Justices Alito and Gorsuch, who criticized
the Chief Justice for expressing solicitude for precedent while
reinterpreting Whole Woman’s Health.111 But, even if reiterating
the burdens erected by the Louisiana law attempted to support
his application of stare decisis, the Chief Justice could have
written about precedent without repeating evidence about the
107. See id. at 2141–42 (“Stare decisis instructs us to treat like cases alike.
The result in this case is controlled by our decision four years ago invalidating
a nearly identical Texas law.”).
108. See id. at 2140 (showing deference to the district court by accepting
their findings).
109. See id. (finding similarities between Louisiana’s abortion law and
Texas’s abortion law in Whole Woman’s Health).
110. Id. at 2140 (alterations and omission in original).
111. See Murray, supra note 103, at 325–36 (comparing Chief Justice
Roberts’s decision in Whole Woman’s Health to a “legal version of Dorian
Gray’s portrait”); June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2153
(2020) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The Chief Justice stresses the importance of
stare decisis and thinks that precedent, namely Whole Woman’s Health, dooms
the Louisiana law. But at the same time, he votes to overrule Whole Woman’s
Health insofar as it changed the Casey test.”); id. at 2180–81 (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the concurrence ignored the doctrine of stare decisis
when it applied the “substantial obstacle” standard from Whole Woman’s
Health).
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nature of the obstacles imposed.112 That is not to argue that the
Chief Justice is a champion of abortion rights, but rather to
highlight the evidence of law’s lived effects that five Justices
found credible.113
Given its current composition, the Supreme Court may be
unlikely to apply a balancing approach moving forward.114
Indeed, the question the Court will decide in 2022 is whether all
pre-viability bans are unconstitutional.115 Yet the evidentiary
record in June Medical Services showcases litigators’ and public
health researchers’ coordinated efforts to generate empirical
evidence about the costs of navigating state restrictions.116
Courts cannot know such facts without research to support
them. The point here, however, is not to celebrate the production
of evidence.117 As Aziza Ahmed has shown, evidence-based
strategies are susceptible to manipulation by either end of the
ideological spectrum.118 The point is to underscore the reach of
112. See June Med. Servs. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2139 (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring) (reiterating the district court’s finding that Louisiana’s abortion
law would impose several obstacles for women seeking an abortion).
113. See Reva Siegel, Why Restrict Abortion? Expanding the Frame on
June Medical, 20 SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 6–7),
https://perma.cc/46CT-4QF9
Justices who denounce balancing as legislative rather than judicial
are directing judges to defer to state claims about health. This adds
the courts’ imprimatur to modern forms of protectionism that inflict
physical and dignitary injuries on poor women. The Justices who
denounce balancing as legislative rather than judicial are engaged
in a political project at the very moment they claim to be avoiding
entanglement in politics.
114. Justice Kavanaugh wrote in dissent, “Today, five Members of the
Court reject the Whole Woman’s Health cost-benefit standard.” June Med.
Servs. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2182 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
115. See Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 945 F.3d 265, 268 (5th
Cir. 2019), cert. granted in part, 141 S. Ct. 216 (2021) (“The central question
before us is whether [Mississippi’s abortion] law is an unconstitutional ban on
pre-viability abortions.”).
116. See June Med. Servs. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 211516 (majority
opinion) (discussing the evidentiary record).
117. See Aziza Ahmed, Medical Evidence and Expertise in Abortion
Jurisprudence, 41 AM. J.L. & MED. 85, 110 (2015) (noting courts’ distinctions
between ideology and fact when upholding abortion restrictions and warning
that generating expertise in abortion law also has advanced “a conservative
political project”).
118. See id. at 86–87 (explaining how judges have viewed medical evidence
and expertise through the lens of ideology).
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public health research on the unequal distribution of health
resources, as ACOG v. FDA illustrates.

C.

ACOG v. FDA

ACOG v. FDA is distinct from Whole Woman’s Health and
June Medical Services in that it concerns a federal rule, not a
state law, and rulemaking by an agency, not state legislators.119
Nevertheless, at the heart of the case is an analysis of the undue
burden standard, under which the court adopted evidence of the
multi-level burdens imposed by law.120
The case concerns the FDA’s restrictions on mifepristone,
which is the first drug ingested in a medication abortion.121 The
second drug, misoprostol, is taken twenty-four to forty-eight
hours after mifepristone and it is not subject to the same
restrictions.122 The FDA applies a drug safety program—a Risk
Evaluation
and
Mitigation
Strategy
or
REMS—to
mifepristone.123 The FDA issues a REMS for drugs it deems
potentially risky and in need of monitoring.124 With a REMS, the
FDA can issue an Elements to Assure Safe Use (ETASU), which
can limit distribution and set the terms of who can prescribe a
119. See Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. FDA, 506 F. Supp.
3d 328, 333–36 (D. Md. 2020).
120. See id. at 339 (noting that COVID-19 has impacted individuals’ access
to abortion clinics).
121. Id. at 331. Almost all medication abortions are completed through a
mifepristone-misoprostol regimen. See Rachel K. Jones & Jenna Jerman,
Abortion Incidence and Service Availability in the United States, 2014, 49
PERSPS. ON SEXUAL & REPRO. HEALTH 17, 22 (2017) (“While other drugs can be
administered
in
early
medication
abortion,
the
overwhelming
majority— 97%—were done with mifepristone.”).
122. See Questions and Answers on Mifeprex, FDA, https://perma.cc/87ZRPXB7 (last updated Apr. 13, 2021) (“Mifeprex (mifepristone) is a drug that
blocks a hormone called progesterone that is needed for a pregnancy to
continue. Mifeprex, when used together with another medicine called
misoprostol, is used to end an early pregnancy (70 days or less since the first
day of the last menstrual period).”); The Availability and Use of Medication
Abortion, supra note 25 (stating that misoprostol, taken twenty-four to
forty-eight hours after mifepristone, empties the uterus by causing cramping).
123. See FDA, MIFEPREX RISK EVALUATION AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES
1 (2016), https://perma.cc/SHF2-2P5R (PDF) (stating the goals of the REMS).
124. See
Risk
Evaluation
and
Mitigation
Strategies,
FDA,
https://perma.cc/98TD-DUMY (last updated Aug. 8, 2019) (explaining what a
REMS is).
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drug and under what conditions.125 Modified in 2016, FDA’s
mifepristone REMS includes an ETASU with several parts;
relevant here is the requirement that patients collect
mifepristone at a healthcare facility—a hospital, clinic, or
medical office.126 The effect of in-person collection has been to
prohibit retail pharmacies and mail-order prescription services
from distributing mifepristone, though some commentators
dispute whether such a prohibition follows from the ETASU’s
language.127 The ETASU does not mandate that the provider be
physically present when the drug regimen is collected or taken
by the patient.128 Thus, mifepristone (and misoprostol) can be
self-administered outside of a healthcare setting.129
The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
(ACOG), the leading professional organization in the field,
brought suit with four other parties to enjoin the in-person

125. See ETASU Explained, AIMED ALL. (2020), https://perma.cc/2DCDNSRV (“ETASU are carefully planned safety systems that control how a
medication is administered by health professionals and taken by patient.”).
126. See FDA, supra note 123, at 1. In 2016, the FDA approved use of
mifepristone from forty-nine days to seventy days from the first day of the last
menstrual period, lowered the dose regimen, permitted non-physician
providers to apply for certification to prescribe mifepristone, and allowed
patients to take mifepristone outside a healthcare facility even though the
drug had to be dispensed at a health care facility. See Rachel K. Jones &
Heather Boonstra, The Public Health Implications of the FDA’s Update to the
Medication
Abortion
Label,
HEALTH AFFS.
(June
30,
2016),
https://perma.cc/9PTP-CKQR. See generally GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
INFORMATION ON MIFEPREX LABELING CHANGES AND ONGOING MONITORING
EFFORTS (Mar. 2018), https://perma.cc/73LN-K9DL (PDF). For certification
under the ETASU, providers must submit a form to the drug sponsor attesting
that they can “assess the duration of pregnancy accurately,” “diagnose ectopic
pregnancies,” and “provide surgical intervention” or “have made plans to
provide such care through others.” FDA, supra note 123, at 7. Patients must
receive a Medication Guide and sign a Patient Agreement Form; providers
agree to report any adverse events. Id. The Patient Agreement Form outlines
the drug’s risks and benefits, and it emphasizes the need to follow up with a
provider seven to fourteen days after completing the drug regimen. Id.
127. See infra Part III.B; Manian, supra note 8, at 1331–33 (describing
longstanding efforts to restrict medication abortion).
128. See FDA, supra note 123, at 1.
129. See id. Misoprostol may be mailed to patients, but a medication
abortion regimen includes both drugs, so both are delivered together. See
Manian, supra note 8, at 1331 (describing the protocol).
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ETASU during the pandemic.130 ACOG argued that applying the
in-person ETASU contradicts substantial evidence of the drug’s
safety and is ineffectual in protecting patients.131 Indeed, the
FDA’s management of mifepristone stands out among other
drugs. Of the 20,000 drugs regulated by the FDA, and the
seventeen with the same ETASU, mifepristone is the only one
that patients must retrieve at a medical center but may take
without physician supervision.132 In fact, the FDA permits
mailing to patients’ homes the exact same drug compound as
mifepristone, in higher doses and larger quantities, for
treatment of other conditions—but not for abortion or
miscarriage.133 Moreover, retrieving mifepristone at a
healthcare facility does not reduce the likelihood of a
complication; usually, a provider is not present when the
abortion begins and a patient is not at a healthcare facility.134
Complications, which are very rare, typically occur where the

130. See Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. FDA, 506 F. Supp.
3d 328, 331 (D. Md. 2020). The other named plaintiffs are the Council of
University Chairs of Obstetrics and Gynecology, the New York State Academy
of Family Physicians, SisterSong Women of Color Reproductive Justice
Collective, and Dr. Honor Macnaughton. Id. SisterSong is a non-profit
organization that has been the leader and a founder of the reproductive justice
movement. See JENNIFER NELSON, MORE THAN MEDICINE: A HISTORY OF THE
FEMINIST WOMEN’S HEALTH MOVEMENT 167–92 (2015) (describing the
leadership of women of color in advocating for reproductive justice).
131. See Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Principal and Response Brief at 2, Am. Coll.
of Obstetricians & Gynecologist v. FDA, 506 F. Supp. 3d 328 (D. Md. 2020)
(Nos. 20-1824, 20-1784, 20-1970), 2021 WL 424851 (“There is no medical
content to this visit: Defendants do not require any clinical services or
counseling when patients pick up their pill, and permit patients to swallow the
pill later, unsupervised, at the location of their choice.”). Mifepristone and
misoprostol are over 96 percent effective in completing a termination and only
0.1 percent of medication abortions result in serious adverse events. NAT’L
ACADS. SCI., ENG’G, & MED., THE SAFETY AND QUALITY OF ABORTION CARE IN THE
UNITED STATES 53–55 (2018), https://perma.cc/M7WR-L4XC (PDF).
132. Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Principal and Response Brief, supra note 131, at
2.
133. See Complaint at 32, Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v.
FDA, 506 F. Supp. 3d 328 (D. Md. 2020) (No. 8:20-cv-01320-TDC), 2020 WL
2771735 (offering the example of endogenous Cushing’s syndrome, a condition
that the same drug compound as mifepristone treats).
134. See id. at 1516 (describing the steps that a patient takes to use
mifepristone).
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patient ingests the medicine, which is usually at the patient’s
home.135
ACOG further highlighted that in-person dispensation for
mifepristone contradicts the FDA’s (and other federal agencies’)
encouragement of telemedicine to reduce patient-provider
contact during the pandemic.136 Along with the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the FDA has urged
providers to reduce patient contact as much as possible.137 To
this end, the FDA suspended REMS for other drugs, such as
certain opioids, that pose far greater risks to patient safety.138
In addition to arguments about mifepristone’s safety and
the FDA’s exceptional treatment of medication abortion, ACOG
emphasized the many ways in which the in-person requirement
exacerbates burdens that are already shouldered by people who
work essential jobs or are unemployed, have lost health
insurance, live in multi-generational homes, and lack

135. The U.S. Government Accountability Office found that between 2000
and 2017, over 3 million people terminated pregnancies with medication
abortion and only 4,200 adverse events occurred; of those, only 0.01 to 0.7
percent required hospitalization. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 126,
at 21.
136. See Complaint, supra note 133, at 25–30. The district court detailed
the FDA’s pandemic-based approach on remote drug delivery:
In March and April 2020, FDA informed drug sponsors for two
specific drugs, Spravato and Tysabri, that during the pandemic it
would not enforce the associated ETASU C requirement that a drug
be administered or dispensed only at a hospital, clinic, or medical
office—the same limitation imposed on mifepristone—even though
both still must be administered in-person by a physician.
Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. FDA, 472 F. Supp. 3d 183, 194
(D. Md. 2020).
137. See FDA, POLICY FOR CERTAIN REMS REQUIREMENTS DURING THE
COVID-19 PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY 7 (Mar. 2020), https://perma.cc/MJ9SVBGF (PDF) (recommending that providers be cognizant of patients’ desires
to avoid in-person contact); Secretary Azar Announces Historic Expansion of
Telehealth Access to Combat COVID-19, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
(Mar. 17, 2020), https://perma.cc/94GM-EFEW (announcing that HHS would
waive potential HIPAA violations to promote telemedicine over in-person
visits).
138. See FDA, supra note 137, at 7 (“Although all REMS requirements
remain in effect, FDA does not intend to take enforcement action against
sponsors or others for accommodations made . . . during the PHE . . . provided
that such accommodations were made based on the judgment of a health care
professional.”).
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transportation.139 ACOG relied on evidence that low-income
patients and people of color are more likely to become ill, to have
inadequate resources to respond to illness, and to have worse
health outcomes as a result of existing health inequalities.140
In July 2020, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Maryland issued a nationwide injunction of the in-person
requirement for the duration of the COVID-19 national
emergency.141 The court held that the ETASU was an undue
burden because requiring travel to a hospital, clinic, or medical
office to pick up a drug that can be taken at home offers no
medical benefit.142 And any possible benefit was outweighed by
the burdens that the ETASU imposed, such as increased risk of
exposure to COVID-19.143
After the district court’s decision, more providers began to
counsel patients through telehealth, mailing mifepristone to
patients through a supervised delivery service or through online
(but not retail) pharmacies.144 Well before the July decision, an
ongoing national study of “TelAbortion” had demonstrated the

139. See Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 472 F. Supp. 3d at 224
(noting that COVID-19 disproportionately impacts marginalized populations).
140. Id.
141. See id. at 232.
142. See id. at 220 (finding that telemedicine is an acceptable alternative
to the requirement that patients take mifepristone in-person).
143. See id. at 221.
144. See Elizabeth Raymond et al., TelAbortion: Evaluation of a Direct to
Patient Telemedicine Abortion Service in the United States, 100
CONTRACEPTION 173, 174 (2019) (discussing several studies focused on
teleabortion);
Evaluation
of
Telemedicine
in
Iowa,
ANSIRH,
https://perma.cc/275K-99YC
The first telemedicine abortion program began in Iowa in 2008.
Between 2008 and 2015, Planned Parenthood clinics in the state
performed 8,765 medication abortions via telemedicine, all
following the same protocol. A patient came into the clinic for an
intake appointment, including an ultrasound, and a provider
reviewed her images and medical history remotely. The provider
spoke with the patient via videoconference, after which the provider
entered a password to unlock a drawer in front of the patient, where
the medication abortion pills were held. The patient took the first
pill, mifepristone, in front of the provider via videoconference, and
the second pill at home. Within two weeks, the patient returned to
the clinic for a follow-up to ensure the abortion was complete.
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effectiveness and safety of remote care.145 In 2016, Gynuity
Health Projects received an Investigational New Drug Approval
to deliver medication abortion without the in-person collection
requirement.146 Providers counseled patients through
videoconferencing, and patients confirmed gestational age with
blood tests and ultrasounds at a location of their choosing.147
During the pandemic, study participants who were at low risk
of complications did not have to undergo an ultrasound or have
a blood test; rather, gestational age was assessed by home
pregnancy tests and questions about the date of the patient’s
last menstrual period.148 The Gynuity provider then mailed the
medication abortion regimen directly to the patient and
requested to meet the patient online seven to fourteen days
after.149 Other ETASU requirements, such as receiving the
Medication Guide or signing the Patient Agreement form, also
occurred virtually.150

145. See Daniel Grossman & Kate Grindlay, Safety of Medical Abortion
Through Telemedicine Compared with In Person, 130 OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 778, 778 (2017) (concluding that “[a]dverse events are rare with
medical abortion, and telemedicine provision is noninferior to in-person
provision with regard to clinically significant adverse events”).
146. The Gynuity project started with five states and now includes
eighteen states and Washington, D.C. See infra Part III.B. An Investigational
New Drug Approval allows research on an approved drug, but for a
non-approved use. Raymond et al., supra note 144, at 174.
147. See Raymond et al., supra note 144, at 174 (outlining the screening
and intake process for participants). The protocol adopted by Gynuity reflects
FDA counseling and informational requirements. Also, ultrasounds and blood
tests to confirm pregnancy can be covered by insurance or Medicaid. Id. at 174.
148. See Hillary Bracken et al., Alternatives to Routine Ultrasound for
Eligibility Assessment Prior to Early Termination of Pregnancy with
Mifepristone-Misoprostol, 118 BJOG 17–23 (2011) (concluding that using the
last menstrual period and physical examination alone are highly effective in
determining a woman’s eligibility for early termination of pregnancy); Ushma
D. Upadhyay & Daniel Grossman, Telemedicine for Medication Abortion, 100
CONTRACEPTION 351, 352 (2019) (describing research, which assesses no-touch
protocols and demonstrates 95 percent accuracy in identifying patients within
the eligible gestational limit for medication abortion).
149. See Raymond et al., supra note 144, at 174 (explaining that a
follow-up is scheduled with the participant seven to fourteen days after the
package containing the medicine was mailed).
150. The district court clarified that patients and providers were permitted
to sign or give verbal consent to the terms of the Patient Agreement form
(required by the ETASU) during a telehealth session. See Order, Am. Coll. of
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Based in part on studies demonstrating the safety and
efficacy of remote abortion care,151 the district court in ACOG v.
FDA enjoined the in-person requirement as an undue burden,
drawing from health research demonstrating patients’
experiences, effects on particular populations, and the broader
consequences for public health.152 The district court rejected
Chief Justice Roberts’s version of the undue burden test in June
Medical Services.153 Instead, the district court applied Whole
Woman’s Health’s balancing test because the “common
denominator” of the June Medical Services plurality was “that a
‘substantial obstacle’ based solely on consideration of burdens is
sufficient to satisfy the undue burden standard, [but] not that it
is necessary.”154 Because five Supreme Court justices agreed

Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. FDA, No. 20-1320 (D. Md. Aug. 19, 2020)
2020 WL 8167535.
151. In a study of the first thirty-two months of the Gynuity program, two
of 217 participants reported serious adverse events but “neither event would
have been averted had the abortion medications been provided in person.”
Raymond et al., supra note 144, at 176. Participants were either satisfied (20
percent) or very satisfied (80 percent) with their experiences. Id.
152. Note that the district court, while framing the decision in terms of
public health, referred to the common sense of what obstacles abortion
restrictions impose: “the extensive evidence relating to the burdens of the
In-Person Requirements during the COVID-19 pandemic supports the
‘commonsense inference’ that they present a substantial obstacle to a large
fraction of the women for whom the In-Person Requirements are relevant.”
Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. FDA, 472 F. Supp. 3d 183, 224
(D. Md. 2020) (citing Whole Woman’s Health for its “holding that courts may
draw ‘commonsense inferences’ from the evidence in assessing whether an
undue burden exists”).
153. See id. at 209 (noting that “the holding of June Medical Services is
fairly limited to the reasoning that represents a ‘common denominator’ that
he shared with the plurality”).
154. Id. The Supreme Court has held that “[w]hen a fragmented Court
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent
of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken
by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.’”
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)). Applying the Marks test differently, the Eighth
Circuit asked a district court to reconsider its injunction against four Arkansas
abortion restrictions because June Medical Services eliminated the Whole
Woman’s Health balancing test and required only assessment of burdens
caused by law. See Hopkins v. Jegley, 968 F.3d 912, 916 (8th Cir. 2020)
(vacating the district court’s preliminary injunction). Under the Eighth
Circuit’s reasoning, the narrowest ground for June Medical Services is the test
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that Act 620 erected a substantial obstacle, “June Medical
Services is appropriately considered to have been decided
without the need to apply or reaffirm the balancing test of Whole
Woman’s Health,” leaving no reason to believe “that Whole
Woman’s Health and its balancing test have been overruled.”155
In applying the undue burden test, the district court
detailed the cumulative effects of abortion restrictions based on
expert testimony and evidence introduced by ACOG, finding
that the “combination of such barriers can establish a
substantial obstacle.”156 After holding that the government had
not proved any of the ETASU’s alleged benefits, the district
court developed a strong factual case for the harm caused by the
in-person restriction.157 The practical and economic strains on
providers during the pandemic have caused clinics to scale back
operating hours or close altogether, creating long wait lists to
collect the drug regimen.158 At the population level, the court
opined that “abortion patients generally face more significant
health risks arising from traveling to a medical facility during
the pandemic . . . . 60 percent of women who have abortions are
people of color, and 75 percent are poor or low-income,” and
those populations are more likely to have preexisting medical
conditions.159 They are also less likely to have access to medical
care, which puts a significant number of abortion patients at
higher risk of illness and death if infected with COVID-19.160
For almost all patients, the pandemic has made arranging
childcare, housing, transport, or time off work difficult. But the
decision highlighted that the majority of people seeking
abortions—low-income patients and people of color—shoulder
offered by Chief Justice Roberts, and courts therefore should consider only
burdens, not benefits, imposed by abortion restrictions. See id.
155. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 472 F. Supp. 3d at 209. On
appeal, the FDA asked the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to
apply Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence in June Medical Services. See
Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees’ Opening Brief at 33, Am. Coll. of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. FDA, Nos. 20-1784, 20-1824, 20-1970 (4th
Cir. Oct. 26, 2020), 2020 WL 6319261 (arguing that the district court
misapplied the Marks test).
156. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 472 F. Supp. 3d at 216.
157. See id. at 21216.
158. See id. at 214.
159. Id. at 21415.
160. Id. at 215.
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these hardships disproportionately.161 To take the example of
travel, the district court cited the testimony of providers who
recounted that many of their patients do not own a car, cannot
afford private transportation, and should avoid public
transportation if possible.162 The court summarized that the
combination of barriers—from inflexible work hours to the lack
of childcare—delayed individuals from receiving a medication
abortion, “which can either increase the health risk to them or,
in light of the ten-week limit . . . prevent them from receiving a
medication abortion at all.”163
The district court’s suspension lasted six months.164 The
FDA appealed the case to the Fourth Circuit,165 and asked the
Supreme Court to stay the injunction.166 In October 2020, the
Supreme Court denied the government’s request, instructing
the FDA to return to the district court and for the district court
to revise or to suspend its ruling if conditions had changed.167
The district court declined to lift its order, prompting a second
petition for a stay, which the Court granted on January 12,
2021.168
Although the FDA has taken a different course under the
Biden Administration,169 the arguments defending the ETASU,
particularly in the first stay petitions, elucidate opposing
approaches to health evidence. Briefs filed in October 2020 by
ten states and the solicitor general (on behalf of the FDA)
contested that in-person dispensation imposes any heightened
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 216.
164. Id. at 233.
165. Notice of Appeal to the Fourth Circuit at 1, Am. Coll. of Obstetricians
& Gynecologists v. FDA, 472 F. Supp. 3d 183 (D. Md. 2020) (No. 20-1320), ECF
No. 95.
166. Application for a Stay of the Injunction Issued by the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland at 9, FDA v. Am. Coll. of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 141 S. Ct. 578 (2021) (No. 20A34), ECF No. 1.
167. On Application for Stay at 1, Am. Coll. of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 141 S. Ct. 578 (No. 20A34), ECF No. 19.
168. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 141 S. Ct. at 578.
169. See Abigail Abrams, Why Abortion Pills Are the Next Frontier in the
Battle Over Reproductive Rights, TIME (Apr. 13, 2021, 9:00 PM),
https://perma.cc/YAU8-ZHL6 (discussing how the Biden Administration
reversed the Trump Administration’s policy on mailing abortion medication).
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risks for patients.170 For example, the brief submitted by ten
states asserted:
As States have reopened with the benefit of public health
precautions, a one-time visit to medical facilities presents no
greater risk than engaging in a variety of other public
activities that state public health officials have judged safe
to resume. And women now have a greater range of safe,
affordable childcare and transportation options than earlier
in the pandemic.171

States such as Arkansas, which suspended abortion in March
2020 purportedly to protect people from COVID-19, claimed that
the pandemic posed only a minimal threat for people who need
abortion care.172 In the same vein, the solicitor general argued
that mask mandates, increased testing, and better treatment
have “mitigated or resolved” any burdens on travel, finances, or
childcare.173 In other words, medication abortion presents a
health and safety risk, but potential COVID-19 contraction does
not.
ACOG replied that on “the day Defendants filed their
motion, approximately 100,000 people in the United States were
diagnosed with COVID-19—a new global record—and nearly
1,000 people died from it.”174 ACOG further showed that in the

170. Brief of Intervenors-Appellants at 48, Am. Coll. of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists v. FDA, Nos. 20-1784, 20-1824, 20-1970 (4th Cir. Oct. 26, 2020),
ECF No. 45; Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees’ Opening Brief, supra
note 155 at 43. Indiana, Louisiana, Alabama, Arkansas, Idaho, Kentucky,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, and Oklahoma (collectively, “the States”)
moved to intervene on June 28, 2020. Brief of Intervenors-Appellants, supra,
at 2. On June 15, 2020, the district court denied the States’ motion to
intervene. Id. The States then filed a motion to reconsider, which the district
court denied on July 13, 2020. Id.
171. Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Their Renewed Motion to
Stay the Preliminary Injunction and for an Indicative Ruling Dissolving the
Preliminary Injunction at 1, Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v.
FDA, 472 F. Supp. 3d 183 (D. Md. 2020) (No. 20-1320), ECF No. 141-2
[hereinafter Defendant’s Memorandum in Support].
172. See Brief of Intervenors-Appellants, supra note 170, at 53 (stating
that “nothing supports a conclusion that abortion patients would be
irreparably harmed” by attending in-person appointments).
173. See Defendants’ Memorandum in Support, supra note 171, at 5
(asserting that the burdens imposed by COVID-19 are no longer obstacles).
174. Plaintiffs’ Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Renewed Motion to Stay
the Preliminary Injunction at 1, Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v.
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intervening months since the district court’s ruling, the FDA
had not produced any evidence that the injunction had caused
harm to any patient.175
At the heart of the case was a battle between deference to
policymakers versus public health evidence—evidence that
undermined granting deference to government actors. While
defending the lawsuit, the FDA’s repeated a theme of
pandemic-related litigation: legislators “should not be subject to
second-guessing by an ‘unelected federal judiciary,’ which lacks
the background, competence, and expertise to assess public
health.”176 By contrast, ACOG endeavored to prove that
delaying and denying abortion exacerbates health inequalities
and contributes to a health-care crisis now and beyond the
pandemic.177 When people do not have access to local abortion
services, they will travel far distances, self-induce terminations,
or carry unwanted pregnancies to term.178 Each of those options
can have short-term and long-term costs, as public health
research proves.179
The parties made similar arguments between deference and
evidence in December 2020, when the FDA again asked the
Supreme Court to stay the injunction.180 However, the
government, in the face of COVID-19 surges, revised its
contention that the risks of the pandemic had abated. Instead,
it pointed to two states, Nebraska and Indiana, in which state
FDA, 472 F. Supp. 3d 183 (D. Md. 2020) (20-1320), ECF No. 142 [hereinafter
Plaintiffs’ Brief in Opposition].
175. See id. at 3 (“Defendants concede that they cannot identify any harm
resulting from the injunction over the past four months.”).
176. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1614
(2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
177. See Plaintiffs’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 174, at 18 (contending
that requiring in-person appointments, which are now more scarce, will delay
or block access for patients who are unable to arrange them).
178. See Nina Bai, As More States Restrict Abortions, Research Points to
Negative Health Outcomes for Women, Families, UCSF (May 22, 2019),
https://perma.cc/3N4B-EZWF (detailing the effects that abortion restrictions
will have on women seeking access).
179. See id. (finding large differences in economic outcomes between
women who were denied abortion access and those who were not).
180. Defendants’ Renewed Motion to Stay the Preliminary Injunction and
for an Indicative Ruling Dissolving the Preliminary Injunction at 1, Am. Coll.
of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. FDA, 472 F. Supp. 3d 183 (D. Md. 2020)
(No. 20-1320), ECF No. 141.

1390

78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1355 (2021)

law requires in-person collection of medication abortion and had
seen increases in abortion rates from 2019 to 2020.181 ACOG
highlighted that abortion rates from two states for a one-year
period did not mean that the pandemic had no effect on abortion
access.182 And it again noted the gaps in evidence offered by the
government: the solicitor general did not introduce one
statement from the FDA or CDC or any other health agency; it
produced no evidence from any health expert.183 ACOG, on the
other hand, relied on statements from four leading public health
experts and epidemiologists.184
181. See Defendants’ Memorandum in Support, supra note 171, at 13–14
(citing to a declaration stating that the number of abortions in Nebraska and
Indiana during the pandemic exceeded numbers for the same period the year
prior).
182. See Plaintiffs’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 174, at 18 n.13 (stating
that the argument around the increase in abortions in Indiana and Nebraska
ignores evidence that abortion demand is up). The abortion rates took account
of all abortions, not just medication abortions, and did not compare rates in
states in which restrictions had been suspended. See Declaration of Matthew
Foster at 3–5, Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. FDA, 472 F. Supp.
3d 183 (D. Md. 2020), ECF No. 141-7 (detailing the data for both medication
and surgical abortions). Additionally, the data only compared two years and
failed to account for changes in contraceptive access and use or an increase in
unwanted pregnancies because of the pandemic. See id. (reporting only the
abortion numbers for 2019 and 2020). As Justice Sotomayor stated in her
dissent to the Court’s stay, “[r]eading the Government’s statistically
insignificant, cherry-picked data is no more informative than reading tea
leaves.” FDA v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 141 S. Ct. 578, 584
(2021) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
183.
See Plaintiffs’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 174, at 19 (noting that
the defendants had not produced a declaration from an HHS or FDA expert
regarding COVID-19 risks with travel and in-person activities); id. at 18 n.13
(asserting that the defendants’ argument lacked scientific rigor).
184. See Second Declaration of Arthur L. Reingold, M.D., in Opposition to
Defendants’ Renewed Motion to Stay the Preliminary Injunction and for an
Indicative Ruling Dissolving the Preliminary Injunction, Am. Coll. of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. FDA, 472 F. Supp. 3d 183 (D. Md. 2020) (No.
20-1320), ECF No. 142-1; Declaration of Mary Travis Bassett, M.D., M.P.H.,
Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. FDA, 472 F. Supp. 3d 183 (D.
Md. 2020) (No. 20-1320), ECF No. 142-2; Declaration of Honor MacNaughton,
M.D., Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. FDA, 472 F. Supp. 3d 183
(D. Md. 2020) (No. 20-1320), ECF No. 142-3; Declaration of Trevon D. Logan,
Ph.D., Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. FDA, 472 F. Supp. 3d 183
(D. Md. 2020) (No. 20-1320), ECF No. 142-5. That evidence confirmed what
ACOG had demonstrated throughout the litigation: the burdens of the law and
of the pandemic fall heaviest on low-income patients and people of color, who
comprise the majority of abortion seekers and have been disproportionately
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The Supreme Court issued a stay without explanation.185 In
a short concurrence, Chief Justice Roberts relied on
pandemic-related caselaw: “Here as in related contexts
concerning government responses to the pandemic, my view is
that courts owe significant deference to the politically
accountable entities with the ‘background, competence, and
expertise to assess public health.’”186 In a powerful dissent that
affirmed many of ACOG’s arguments, Justice Sotomayor, joined
by Justice Kagan, qualified what kind of deference the Court
owes the agency:
The Government has not submitted a single declaration from
an FDA or HHS official explaining why the Government
believes women must continue to pick up mifepristone in
person, even though it has exempted many other drugs from
such a requirement given the health risks of COVID-19.
There simply is no reasoned decision here to which this
Court can defer.187

When and whether courts should defer to agencies or
legislatures during a pandemic is not a question this Article
attempts to answer, particularly given the Supreme Court’s
mixed messages on the subject.188 But the lack of clarity as to
when deference is warranted will have at least one consequence
for abortion litigation: deference invites those bringing
constitutional challenges to continue to amass evidence of the

harmed by COVID-19. See Plaintiffs’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 174, at
18–19; see generally Catherine Powell, Color of COVID and Gender of COVID:
Essential Workers, Not Disposable People, 33 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2021)
185. See FDA v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 141 S. Ct. 578,
578 (2021) (per curiam).
186. Id. at 579 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (quoting S. Bay United
Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1614 (2020)).
187. Id. at 584–85 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see id. at 584 (“Together,
patients’ health vulnerabilities, public transportation risks, susceptible older
family members at home, and clinic closures and reduced services pose
substantial, sometimes insurmountable, obstacles for women seeking
medication abortions during the COVID-19 pandemic.”).
188. Compare S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct.
1613, 1613 (2020) (denying an application for injunctive relief on an order
limiting attendance at places of worship), with Roman Catholic Diocese of
Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 65 (2020) (granting in part an application
for injunctive relief from the Governor’s emergency Executive Order that
imposed occupancy restrictions on places of worship).
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burdens restrictions impose.189 In this vein, the Court’s
invocation of deference during the pandemic may do the same
work that factual “uncertainty” did after Gonzales.190
The FDA’s review of the mifepristone REMS will turn on
the public health research that helped ACOG make its case. The
next Part illustrates the work of research centers that have
generated studies on the effects of abortion restrictions. As the
last section argues, the value of research on abortion law is not
just the possibility of producing evidence that convinces courts;
indeed, the Court’s stay in ACOG suggests that not much may
convince the highest Court of the country. Rather, the
collaboration among researchers, academics, advocates, and
lawyers has created an infrastructure for abortion delivery
rooted in community and political engagement.
II.

THE EVOLVING ROLE OF PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH

Abortion debates have long been waged on the terrain of
contested expertise and facts, and health-based arguments have
been marshalled by both sides since Roe was decided.191

189. See Leah Litman, The Supreme Court Won’t Explain Why It Just
Greenlit New Abortion Restrictions, SLATE (Jan. 14, 2021, 11:15 AM),
https://perma.cc/S3K8-UU6E (noting that, without explanation of the stay, the
Court “may have instead arrived at their own independent conclusion that the
in-person requirement is constitutional, which would signal that the court has
significantly watered down of the legal test governing abortion restrictions
behind the scenes”).
190. See infra Part III.A; Lindsay F. Wiley & Stephen I. Vladeck,
Coronavirus, Civil Liberties, and the Courts: The Case Against “Suspending”
Judicial Review, 133 HARV. L. REV. F. 179, 19091 (2020) (arguing that
Jacobson v. Massachusetts encourages judicial review by suggesting a
balancing test for emergency health measures); Wendy E. Parmet,
Rediscovering Jacobson in the Era of COVID-19, 100 B.U. L. REV. ONLINE 117,
13031 (2020) (disputing that Jacobson v. Massachusetts is the apt framework
for legislative deference).
191. Abortion opponents have also sought to generate evidence that
abortion correlates with negative health effects, suggesting that abortion leads
to breast cancer or mental health problems. ZIEGLER, supra note 5, at 124;
Myths About Abortion and Breast Cancer, PLANNED PARENTHOOD at 1 (Mar.
2013), https://perma.cc/HS3T-8C9B (PDF). Those efforts have been dwarfed by
the research supportive of abortion access, in part because of better funding
but also because of stronger alliances with respected academics and reliance
on credible research methods. ZIEGLER, supra note 5, at 199. Mary Ziegler
points out that,

THE PUBLIC HEALTH TURN

1393

Although research on the health consequences of abortion
restrictions is not new, in recent years, there has been a shift in
the scope and kind of evidence generated.192 An impetus for this
shift is the substantial investment in rigorous research on the
regulation of abortion facilities and providers.193 This
investment has yielded an increasing number of experts and
organizations that study the health and social consequences of
abortion restrictions.194 Research teams at the University of
[s]ince 2007, abortion opponents had tried to expand their capacity
for research. In 2011, the Susan B. Anthony List founded the
Charlotte Lozier Institute as an alternative to abortion-rights
research groups. Texas and pro-life organizations cited evidence
collected by sympathetic researchers, but as many abortion
opponents realized, supporters of abortion-rights had an advantage
in research funding and access to data.
Id.
192. The Guttmacher Institute, which was founded originally as the
Center for Family Planning Program and Development, has been generating
research on the effects of abortion restrictions on individual and population
health since 1968. The History of the Guttmacher Institute, GUTTMACHER INST.,
https://perma.cc/BB4R-SXTA. The Institute’s work is not spotlighted in Part
II, but it is the clear leader in producing studies on abortion law by
demographers, social scientists, and public policy analysts. Id.
193. The investment in research hubs is a product of concentrated,
coordinated funding by one of the largest private foundations in the country.
See Nina Martin, How One Abortion Research Megadonor Forced the Supreme
Court’s Hand, MOTHER JONES (July 14, 2016), https://perma.cc/2XXF-FP9L
(reporting that private donors poured at least 200 million dollars into the
research Justice Breyer cited in Whole Woman’s Health); Kelsey Piper, How
Billionaire Philanthropy Provides Reproductive Health Care When Politicians
Won’t, VOX (Sept. 17, 2019, 8:10 AM), https://perma.cc/B4EH-SMUB (stating
that reproductive health care “would suffer greatly if billionaire philanthropy
was reduced in scale or ceased to exist tomorrow”); GUTTMACHER INST., ANNUAL
REPORT 2019, https://perma.cc/YN92-G9TM (PDF) (showing that 65 percent of
the organization’s funding is from private U.S. foundations, and listing
“anonymous” and the Gates Foundation as foundation-based donors).
194. See ZIEGLER, supra note 5, at 199
Abortion-rights supporters relied on studies completed by the Texas
Policy Evaluation Project, organized in 2011 at the University of
Texas-Austin by doctors, demographers, and public health experts.
The project received financial support from the Susan Thompson
Buffett Foundation, a major donor to abortion-rights causes, and its
members included Daniel Grossman, the new head of Advancing
New Standards in Reproductive Health, a leading research center
supportive of abortion-rights.
ANSIRH was founded in 2002 but began to expand operations between 2009
and 2012. See About, ANSIRH, https://perma.cc/SU58-UD5E. TxPEP “began
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Texas and the University of California, San Francisco (UCSF),
for example, have investigated what happens to people who seek
abortions when clinics close and providers are forced out of
practice.195 Indeed, a new generation of peer reviewed studies
(as well as the longstanding work of the Guttmacher Institute)
helped shape the application of the undue burden test
established in Whole Woman’s Health and conferred credibility
and certainty in the aftermath of Gonzales v. Carhart.196
A recurring challenge, however, has been to convince courts
that abortion restrictions correlate with individual and
community health outcomes.197 A number of courts have
accepted states’ arguments that the difficulties clinics
experience in implementing regulations, such as an
admitting-privileges requirement, reflect “neutral, pre-existing
states of affairs unrelated to the legislation itself.”198 Take, for
example, Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion in Whole Woman’s
Health v. Hellerstedt, in which he argued that clinic closures
were not caused by a privileges law; instead, clinic closures were
the result of provider shortages and an overall decreasing rate
in the fall of 2011 with the purpose of documenting and evaluating the impact
of reproductive health legislation passed by the 82nd Texas Legislature.”
TxPEP Fact Sheet, UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, https://perma.cc/V34S-RYMF.
195. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 68, at 155 (describing the increased
number of women who lived more than one hundred miles from an abortion
facility and the increase in wait times at these facilities following facility
closure in Texas due to H.B. 2). The research teams based at universities
include demographers, social epidemiologists, social scientists, or public
health academics. See, e.g., Investigators & Staff, ANSIRH,
https://perma.cc/5FDR-RWQZ.
196. See Martin, supra note 193 (demonstrating that the purpose of funding
centers and studies like those identified in this Part was to provide evidence
offering courts certainty in the aftermath of Gonzales v. Carhart); B. Jessie Hill,
The Geography of Abortion Rights, 109 GEO. L.J. 1081, 1112 (2021)
Some courts and scholars have begun to recognize, however, that
the geographical disparities that result from facility regulation are
a direct result of state policies. In Whole Woman’s Health, the Court
recognized for the first time the disproportionate impact of facility
regulations on poor and rural women and used this fact as a reason
in support of its decision.
197. See Hill, supra note 196, at 1111–12 (explaining that courts do not
consider how various laws reduce abortion access).
198. Id. at 1111; see ZIEGLER, supra note 5, at 122 (“Abortion foes had
promoted incremental restrictions and often defended them by emphasizing
claims about the costs of abortion.”).
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of abortion.199 Studies of people’s health and financial well-being
after they have sought out and failed to obtain abortions because
of service scarcity attempt to substantiate explanations about
the negative impact of restrictive abortion laws.200
The subparts that follow offer examples of research that
advances the health case against abortion restrictions. Again,
this Article’s purpose is not to extoll the inherent value of
evidence or suggest that all research is of the same quality or
significance. The purpose is to spotlight how research has
advanced more nuanced understandings of abortion laws’ health
effects, and to locate that work as contributing to a movement
for abortion access. To that end, this Part will track how
abortion law research has shifted from a focus on patients to
assessments of the burdens that abortion restrictions impose on
populations and on the general public. Here, “populations”
refers to groups that share characteristics, such as income level
or race. “Public health” includes the study of populations, but,
in this account, concerns the health disparities that characterize
the healthcare system and perpetuate inequality. This Part
concludes by describing a shared political project among
abortion-supportive researchers, advocates, and lawyers and
how that collaboration draws from scholarship on the social
determinants of health.
A.

Patients

Research on the patient-level effects of facility closures has
been the most visible in contemporary litigation of restrictions
on providers and facilities. Petitioners in Whole Woman’s Health
urged that Casey required courts to assess evidence of the
benefits and burdens of a restriction, and to resist reliance on

199. See Mary Ziegler, The Jurisprudence of Uncertainty: Knowledge,
Science, and Abortion, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 317, 355, 357 (2018) (noting that
Whole Woman’s Health turned on a question about the Texas statute’s causal
effects).
200. See The Turnaway Study, ANSIRH, https://perma.cc/M8H2-9G62
(finding that women denied abortions are four times more likely to live in
poverty and are more likely to experience serious health complications from
pregnancy).
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the state’s proffered reasons for regulating.201 Consider the
genesis of the studies cited in Whole Woman’s Health. The Texas
Policy Evaluation Project (TxPEP), housed at the University of
Texas at Austin Population Research Center, is “a collaborative
group of university-based investigators who evaluate the impact
of legislation in Texas related to women’s reproductive
health.”202 Before H.B. 2 was implemented in the fall of 2013,
TxPEP researchers contacted the forty-one abortion providers
open in Texas at the end of 2012 (including those that
subsequently closed) and obtained information on the services
provided through April 2014.203 Comparing the first six months
of enforcement with the previous year, studies documented a 13
percent reduction in abortion procedures.204 There was also a
statistically significant increase in the number of abortions
performed after twelve weeks of gestation.205
In addition, TxPEP studied the barriers to services after
clinics closed and left remaining providers concentrated in the
state’s larger cities.206 When H.B. 2 took effect, the number of
201. See Ziegler, supra note 199, at 359 (explaining that Casey “involve[d]
two important considerations, the government’s interest in protecting fetal life
and a woman’s constitutional liberty and equality”).
202. TxPEP, UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, https://perma.cc/RQY3-TLNE.
TxPEP collaborates with Advancing New Standards in Reproductive Health
(ANSIRH), the work of which is detailed in Part II.B. The director of ANSIRH,
Dr. Daniel Grossman, is also an investigator for TxPEP and Part I.A notes the
influence of his research on the decision in Whole Woman’s Health. Texas
Policy Evaluation Project (TxPEP), ANSIRH, https://perma.cc/K89E-K8UL
In 2011, and again in 2013, the Texas Legislature passed sweeping
legislation impacting reproductive health in Texas, which has a
population of 5.4 million women of reproductive age. . . . ANSIRH’s
Director, Dr. Dan Grossman, co-leads the Texas Policy Evaluation
Project (TxPEP), a collaborative effort to analyze and document the
effects of these measures on Texas women and their families.
203. See Liza Fuentes et al., Women’s Experiences Seeking Abortion Care
Shortly After the Closure of Clinics Due to A Restrictive Law in Texas, 93
CONTRACEPTION 292, 293 n.1 (2016) (discussing the dwindling number of
facilities that were open throughout the time period).
204. See Daniel Grossman et al., Change in Abortion Services After
Implementation of a Restrictive Law in Texas, 90 CONTRACEPTION 496, 499
(2014) (describing how the decline resulted in about 9,200 fewer abortions).
205. See Gerdts et al., supra note 18, at 862 (showing an increase in
abortion rates from 10.2 percent to 14.6 percent after the nearest clinic closed
in 2014).
206. See Abortion Wait Times in Texas: The Shrinking Capacity of
Facilities and the Potential Impact of Closing Non-ASC Clinics, TEX. POL’Y
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women of reproductive age that lived over 100 miles from the
nearest provider increased from 400,000 to 1,000,000. 207 Wait
times for appointments increased: in the Dallas metropolitan
area, the wait time increased from five days to twenty-one days
or longer.208
TxPEP researchers conducted extensive interviews with
abortion patients about clinic closures’ impact on costs and
travel.209 The data collected showed that “women whose nearest
clinic had closed traveled four times farther to obtain an
abortion—eighty-five miles on average each way—compared
with those whose nearest clinic remained open. In addition,
more women whose nearest clinic closed had out-of-pocket
expenditures greater than $100 (32% v. 20%).”210

EVALUATION PROJECT (Oct. 5, 2015), https://perma.cc/D8RZ-635L (PDF)
(assessing wait times at open facilities in large Texas cities after closures due
to H.B. 2).
207. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2298
(2016) (citing the district court’s factual findings, which relied on TxPEP
research). Additional studies have examined the relationship between
abortion rates and increased travel distance to the nearest provider. Even
short travel increases can correlate with lower abortion incidence:
Our econometric analysis indicates that travel distance has a
substantial and non-linear effect on abortion rates. If the nearest
clinic is 0 miles away, we estimate that a 25 mile increase in
distance reduces the abortion rate by close to 10 percent. If the
nearest clinic is farther away, the effect of additional increases in
distance are smaller. At the point that the nearest clinic is 200
miles away, we no longer detect statistically significant reductions
in abortion caused by further increases in distance. In addition to
finding that even modest initial increases in distance have
substantial effects on abortion rates, we find that abortion clinic
closures affect abortion rates through congestion, as measured by
the number of women served per clinic in a region.
Jason M. Lindo et al., How Far Is Too Far? New Evidence on Abortion Clinic
Closures, Access, and Abortions 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper
No. 23366, 2018), https://perma.cc/4MMX-BW53 (PDF); see Jonathan M.
Bearak et al., Disparities and Change Over Time in Distance Women Would
Need to Travel to Have an Abortion in the USA: A Spatial Analysis, 2 LANCET
PUB. HEALTH e493, e495, e499 (2017) (discussing the barriers that increased
distance to clinics imposes and how travel to clinics in Texas increased about
fifty-six miles during the studied time period).
208. See Grossman, supra note 68, at 155 (describing the increased wait
times resulting from facility closures).
209. Id. at 156.
210. Id.
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Numerous factors dictate clinic capacity and patients’
access to abortion services. Michelle McGowan and her
co-investigators describe how physician training and
availability, clinics’ financial sustainability, and staffing and
ownership arrangements, all of which can appear relatively
distinct from legal restrictions, determine the accessibility of
services.211 But financial and personnel arrangements are made
with the legal landscape in view:
[A]bortion facilities must expend considerable financial and
human capital in order to comply with restrictions such as
targeted regulations of abortion provider laws, in-person
visits for state-mandated counseling and other onerous
administrative requirements. These laws and regulations
can require institutional and personnel adaptations that
may divert financial resources and staff time away from
providing care.212

Abortion providers’ isolation from other healthcare makes them
easy regulatory targets. Jessie Hill argues that this isolation, in
tandem with the “concentration of hospitals in urban areas,”
“the refusal of most hospitals to perform abortions,” “industry
norms,” and “the widespread religious affiliation of hospitals,”
allows states to claim that barriers to access are not within
legislators’ control.213 Hill writes, “[t]he legal rule, which does
not appear to be aimed at advancing moral goals (such as
reducing abortions), relies upon realities on the ground to
achieve precisely those goals.”214
To capture the “realities on the ground” of restrictive legal
environments, another vein of abortion research interrogates

211. See Michelle L. McGowan et al., Care Churn—Why Keeping Clinic
Doors Open Isn’t Enough to Ensure Access to Abortion, 383 NEW ENG. J. MED.
508, 509 (2020) (describing factors separate from legislation that affect
abortion care access).
212. Elizabeth Witwer et al., Abortion Service Delivery in Clinics by State
Policy Climate in 2017, 2 CONTRACEPTION: X 1, 4 (2020).
213. Hill, supra note 196, at 1111.
214. Id. It is beyond the scope of this Article to engage with the rich
literature on state action and state neutrality generally. In the abortion
context, refuting state action as a “cause” of poverty has been the justification
for upholding state funding bans. See infra note 220 and accompanying text.

THE PUBLIC HEALTH TURN

1399

the disproportionate impact of law on specific populations.215
Research on populations that are collectively and consistently
affected by abortion restrictions, as the Court has recognized for
poor and rural patients, seeks to demonstrate a predictable
relationship between facility or provider regulations and
material, physical and mental wellbeing.216 The litigation
strategy in June Medical Services provides an illustration.
B.

Populations

In June Medical Services, several amicus briefs described
the demographics of abortion patients.217 For instance, the
National Health Law Program (N-HELP), a national non-profit
organization, explained:
[T]he harmful effects of the requirement will be felt
exponentially by low-income Louisianans—many of whom
will not be able to access abortion care should the law be
implemented. . . . Communities of color, survivors of
intimate partner violence, and LGBTQ-GNC people are even
215. For the role of “population” and the population perspective in public
health, see WENDY E. PARMET, POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE LAW 2
(2009)
[B]y placing populations at the center of the legal stage while
emphasizing the importance of empirical evidence and probabilistic
thinking, population-based legal analysis can enrich and expand
legal discourse, offering an alternative to the individualism and
formalism that is excessive in much of contemporary American law,
especially contemporary constitutional law.
See also Lindsay F. Wiley, The Struggle for the Soul of Public Health, 41 J.
HEALTH POL., POL’Y, & L. 1083, 1083 (2016) (“The population
perspective— which emphasizes the social determinants of health, collective
action to create healthier communities, and communitarian rationales for
prioritizing health—is as important to public health problem-solving as the
prevention orientation.”).
216. See GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 9 (reporting that 75 percent of
abortion patients are low income and disproportionately affected by
regulations that increase closures of clinics and therefore increase delays and
costs to obtain abortion care).
217. See Brief Amici Curiae for Organizations and Individuals Dedicated
to the Fight for Reproductive Justice, supra note 101, at 7 (discussing
marginalized communities’ unequal access to reproductive healthcare); Brief
of
Amici
Curiae
Reproductive
Justice
Scholars
Supporting
Petitioners-Cross-Respondents at 10, June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S.
Ct. 2103 (2020) (No. 18-1323), 2019 WL 6609232 (addressing how Act 620 will
burden marginalized communities).
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more likely to live in poverty—and, thus, more likely to
experience Act 620 as a practical ban on their right to have
an abortion.218

The N-HELP brief draws from multiple studies documenting
common characteristics of people seeking abortion, both
nationally and in Louisiana.219 As noted above, almost half of
the nation’s abortion patients live below the federal poverty
level,220 and the depth of patients’ economic insecurity is
particularly salient in Louisiana. Louisiana ranks as the third
poorest state in the United States, with one in five residents
living in poverty.221 Like three dozen states, Louisiana does not
permit state funding for abortion services, and, like almost a
dozen states, it restricts abortion coverage in health care
insurance plans.222
218. Brief of Amici Curiae National Health Law Program and National
Network of Abortion Funds Supporting Petitioners-Cross-Respondents at 2,
June Med. Servs. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020) (No. 18-1323), 2019 WL
6698205.
219. See id. at 7, 9, 13–14, 27.
220. See GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 9 (finding that 49 percent of
abortion patients had family incomes below the federal poverty level).
Additional studies draw a correlation between income and unintended
pregnancy. See Lawrence B. Finer & Mia R. Zolna, Unintended Pregnancy in
the United States: Incidence and Disparities, 2006, 84 CONTRACEPTION 478, 483
(2011) (“Poor and low-income women also experienced some of the greatest
increases and highest rates of unintended pregnancy.”). Moreover, the reasons
for terminating a pregnancy are overwhelmingly related to existing financial
stressors and the costs of parenting existing children. See Lawrence B. Finer
et al., Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions: Quantitative and Qualitative
Perspectives, 37 PERSPS. SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 110, 117 (2005) (“Nearly
three-quarters of respondents indicated that they could not afford to have a
child now . . . .”); M. Antonia Biggs et al., Understanding Why Women Seek
Abortions in the U.S., 13 BMC WOMEN’S HEALTH 29, 33 (2013) (reporting that
financial reasons were the most frequently cited reason for an abortion).
221. See David Gray & Monica Bergeron, Louisiana’s Poverty and Child
Poverty Rates Remain High, LA. BUDGET PROJECT (Sept. 18, 2014),
https://perma.cc/A5VP-EBK5 (finding that 19.8 percent of Louisiana’s
population lives below the federal poverty line).
222. According to the Guttmacher Institute,
33 states and the District of Columbia follow the federal standard
[under the Hyde Amendment] and provide abortions in cases of life
endangerment, rape and incest. 4 of these states also provide state
funds for abortions in cases of fetal impairment. 4 of these states
also provide state funds for abortions that are necessary to prevent
grave, long-lasting damage to the person’s physical health.
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National surveys speak to the relationship between race
and income.223 According to 2018 census estimates, 22.5 percent
of Black and 18.8 percent of Latinx individuals live below the
federal poverty level, compared with only 9.5 percent of
whites.224 As the N-HELP brief described, in Louisiana, 32.9
percent of Black residents live below the federal poverty line in
comparison to 12.1 percent of white Louisianans.225 Whole
Woman’s Health, at least by remarking on the burdens
shouldered by rural and low-income people, recognized that
longstanding economic and social vulnerability compounds the
consequences of abortion restrictions.226 Like TxPEP, studies
generated by a team of researchers attempt to demonstrate that
point.227
The work of social scientists and legal epidemiologists at
Advancing New Standards in Reproductive Health (ANSIRH),
which is based at the UCSF Gynecology & Reproductive
Sciences, offers an example.228 ANSIRH collected the first

State Funding of Abortion Under Medicaid, GUTTMACHER INST. (July 1, 2021),
https://perma.cc/TSF3-RN4C. Further, “11 states have laws in effect
restricting insurance coverage of abortion in all private insurance plans
written in the state, including those offered through health insurance
exchanges established under the ACA.” Regulating Insurance Coverage of
Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST. (Sept. 1, 2021), https://perma.cc/2WC3-FYDN.
For the first time since 1976, the 2022 House Labor-HHS-Education funding
bill does not include the Hyde Amendment, which prohibits federal funding for
abortion except in cases of rape, incest or to protect the life of the woman. See
Sandhya Raman, Hyde Amendment Fight Just the First Step in Changing
Abortion
Coverage,
ROLL CALL (July
21,
2021,
6:45
AM),
https://perma.cc/9RZE-27PK.
223. See GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 9 (demonstrating that, in 2014, 75
percent of abortion patients were low income).
224. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY STATUS IN THE LAST 12 MONTHS (2018),
https://perma.cc/BF8Z-UUB5 (PDF).
225. Poverty in Louisiana, WELFARE INFO, https://perma.cc/K85C-CTC5.
226. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2302 (2016)
(noting the disproportionate impact of restrictions on poor and rural patients).
227. See DIANA GREENE FOSTER, THE TURNAWAY STUDY: TEN YEARS, A
THOUSAND WOMEN, AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF HAVING—OR BEING
DENIED— AN ABORTION 15 (2020) (describing Foster’s team’s efforts to “study
the outcomes of both birth and abortion for women with unwanted
pregnancies”).
228. See The Turnaway Study, supra note 200 (“The Turnaway Study is
ANSIRH’s prospective longitudinal study examining the effects of unwanted
pregnancy on women’s lives.”).
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longitudinal data on individuals who sought but could not obtain
an abortion.229 ANSIRH, working with thirty abortion facilities
around the country, recruited over 1,000 participants, and
conducted over 8,000 telephone interviews over five years.230
Participants fell into three study groups.231 The “turnaway”
group were people who sought, but did not receive, an abortion
because their pregnancies exceeded the facility’s gestational age
limit.232 Two groups were included for comparison to the
“turnaway” group: the first group of patients terminated their
pregnancies within the first thirteen weeks while the second
group was comprised of patients who terminated a pregnancy
within two weeks of a gestational age cutoff.233

229. Id. A series of articles resulted from the Turnaway study, and the
findings have recently been published as a book. See FOSTER, supra note 227,
at 13 (“Laying out the findings of the largest study of women’s experiences
with abortion in the United States this book represents the first time that the
results of our in-depth ten-year investigation have been collected in one
place.”); M. Antonia Biggs et al., Women’s Mental Health and Well-Being 5
Years After Receiving or Being Denied an Abortion: A Prospective,
Longitudinal Cohort Study, 74 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 169, 169 (2017) (“This study
presents data from the Turnaway Study, a prospective longitudinal study with
a quasi-experimental design.”); Diana Greene Foster et al., Comparison of
Health, Development, Maternal Bonding, and Poverty Among Children Born
After Denial of Abortion vs. After Pregnancies Subsequent to an Abortion, 172
JAMA PEDIATRICS 1053, 1054–55 (2018) (describing the use of data from the
Turnaway Study); Ushma D. Upadhyay et al., The Effect of Abortion on Having
and Achieving Aspirational One-Year Plans, 15 BMC WOMEN’S HEALTH 102,
102 (2015) (“Data are from the Turnaway Study, a prospective cohort study of
women recruited from 30 abortion facilities across the US.”); Diana Greene
Foster et al., Socioeconomic Outcomes of Women Who Receive and Women Who
Are Denied Wanted Abortions in the United States, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
407, 407 (2018) (“We used data from the Turnaway Study, a 5-year,
longitudinal study of women who presented for abortion care at 1 of 30
facilities throughout the United States between 2008 and 2010.”).
230. See The Turnaway Study, supra note 200 (“[W]e recruited from 30
abortion facilities around the country . . . to select about 1,000 women who
sought abortions . . . . We conducted nearly 8,000 interviews over the course of
the project, and the stories that women shared with us about their lives are
fascinating.”). For more information on the design of the Turnaway Study, see
generally Loren M. Dobkin et al., Implementing a Prospective Study of Women
Seeking Abortion in the United States: Understanding and Overcoming
Barriers to Recruitment, 24 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES e115 (2014).
231. Id. at e116.
232. Id.
233. FOSTER, supra note 227, at 16.
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ANSIRH’s Turnaway Study asked participants about a
number of topics, such as their physical and mental health,
employment and educational attainment, relationship status,
contraceptive use, and emotions attached to pregnancy and
abortion.234 The most common reason given for seeking an
abortion was an inability to afford raising a child.235
Participants also reported that their timing for seeking
abortions depended on collecting funds to cover the cost of travel
and the procedure.236 The study’s authors concluded:
Evidence from surveys indicates that women who were
denied versus received wanted abortions experienced worse
health, higher poverty rates, and higher levels of public
assistance receipt over the next five years. Newly linked
administrative data [e.g., credit reports, bankruptcies, tax
liens] shows that women who were denied abortions
experienced large and persistent increases in markers of
financial distress, even when accounting for pre-existing
differences in the characteristics of women seeking an
abortion at later gestational ages.237

The claim here is not that abortion is the solution for lifting
people out of poverty; the cycle of poverty is too complicated and
pernicious for a singular answer. But what the Turnaway Study
poignantly illustrates is how abortion denial compounds

234. See id. (“We interviewed these women by phone twice a year for up to
five yearsthrough both easy and difficult recoveries from abortion and birth.
We asked about their emotions and mental health, their physical health, their
life goals and financial well-being, and the health and development of their
children.”).
235. The majority of abortion patients (59 percent) have given birth at
least once. See GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 9.
236. Consider the cost of abortion services. The mean price of an aspiration
abortion in the first trimester is $508 and the mean price for a medication
abortion is $535; the median price for an abortion at 20 weeks is $1,195. See
Rachel K. Jones et al., Differences in Abortion Service Delivery in Hostile,
Middle-ground, and Supportive States in 2014, 28 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES
212, 216–17 (2018). In Louisiana, the average cost of a first-trimester abortion
is about $500; a second-trimester abortion is approximately $850. Abortion
Information and Resources, LIFT LA., https://perma.cc/72QC-BBV6.
237. Sarah Miller et al., What Happens After an Abortion Denial? A Review
of Results from the Turnaway Study, 110 AEA PAPERS & PROC. 226, 230 (2020).
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financial hardships with effects for people’s long-term
wellbeing.238
Law plays a key role in obstructing or delaying abortion
care. For one, state gestational time-limits will keep some from
state-approved terminations.239 But it is the web of legal
restrictions—from cumbersome and unnecessary facility
requirements to waiting periods—that increase the cost of
providing services and make every step in the process a
challenge.240 When those challenges are insurmountable, the
Turnaway Study identified the economic and health
consequences that follow for populations already living without
sufficient resources.241
The following subpart considers the present trajectory for
public health research that connects unaffordable and
inaccessible abortion to the inequalities that characterize U.S.
health care. The next subpart shows how that research draws
from scholarship on the social determinants of health, which
interrogates why and how health disparities and inequalities
are perpetuated.
C.

The Public’s Health

Although both June Medical Services and Whole Woman’s
Health interpreted the undue burden standard in light of the
238. See FOSTER, supra 227, at 175 (“It took four years for women who were
turned away and gave birth to catch up to the level of employment experienced
by women just under the limit who received their abortion.”).
239. See THEODORE J. JOYCE ET AL., THE IMPACT OF STATE MANDATORY
COUNSELING AND WAITING PERIOD LAWS ON ABORTION: A LITERATURE REVIEW 15
(2009), https://perma.cc/2WCR-VNT8 (PDF) (“We conclude that mandatory
counseling and waiting period laws that require an additional in-person visit
before the procedure likely increase both the personal and the financial costs
of obtaining an abortion, thereby preventing some women from accessing
abortion services.”).
240. See id. (surveying the literature on mandatory counseling and waiting
periods for abortion and concluding that such laws likely increase the cost of
abortion services); FOSTER, supra note 227, at 47 (“Mandatory waiting periods
are one of those laws that sound good (everyone should get time to think about
such a critical decision) but have unintended consequences in raising the cost
and causing abortions to happen later in pregnancy than women want them.”).
241. See Foster et al., Socioeconomic Outcomes, supra note 229, at 411–12
(“Many women seeking abortion face economic hardship; half live below the
[federal poverty line] and three quarters struggle to pay for food, housing, and
transportation. Denial of abortion services exacerbates this hardship.”).
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burdens imposed on low-income people, neither opinion
mentions race (or gender) discrimination.242 By contrast, the
ACOG decision takes up race and social position explicitly.243
ACOG offered evidence, which the district court endorsed, that
health resources are distributed along lines of race, class, and
location. Moreover, material deprivation and social
subordination have damaging health effects that accumulate
over time.244 ACOG’s brief, for instance, argued that existing
health disparities and inequalities, made worse by the
pandemic, are part of an undue burden analysis:
Significantly, COVID-19’s harms have not been borne
equally. The available data show a particularly high
prevalence of infection in areas with lower average incomes,
which often overlap with areas where a higher percentage of
people of color live. . . . People with fewer resources are also
more likely to live in crowded housing, without extra space
that might allow isolation of a family member sick with
COVID-19; more likely to rely on public transportation; and
generally lack the resources available in wealthier
communities to mitigate the risk of contagion. In addition,
due to longstanding inequities in access to and quality of care
and structural racism, low-income people and people of color
242. See June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2130 (2020)
(“As the District Court stated, both experts and laypersons testified that the
burdens of this increased travel [due to closed abortion clinics] would fall
disproportionately on poor women, who are least able to absorb them.”); Whole
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2298 (2016) (“The dramatic
drop in the number of clinics means fewer doctors, longer waiting times, and
increased crowding.”).
243. See Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. FDA, 506 F. Supp.
3d 328, 344 (D. Md. 2020) (“As particularly relevant to the demographic groups
comprising the majority of women seeking a medication abortion, the Black
unemployment rate remains over 10 percent, and 80 percent of all exits from
the labor force in September 2020 consisted of women.”). Cary Franklin
demonstrated how research on health disparities and inequalities was
important to petitioners’ arguments in Whole Woman’s Health. Franklin,
supra note 67, at 241.
244. See Risk for COVID-19 Infection, Hospitalization, and Death by
Race/Ethnicity, CDC, https://perma.cc/8UE8-SE5Q (last updated July 16,
2021) (demonstrating that Black, Hispanic or Latino, and American Indian
individuals are more likely than white individuals to contract COVID-19);
Ruqaiijah Yearby & Seema Mohapatra, Law, Structural Racism, and the
COVID-19 Pandemic, 7 J.L. & BIOSCI. 1, 2 (2020) (“Racial and ethnic minorities
are disproportionately impacted during pandemics, not due to any biological
difference between races, but rather as a result of social factors.”).
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are more likely to suffer from certain preexisting medical
conditions, such as diabetes, obesity, and hypertension, that
make them high risk for severe COVID-19 illness and
fatality.245

The burden of in-person collection is not just the imposition of
logistical difficulties. The problem is also that those
complications compound for people who already have
inadequate resources, and those stressors have long-term health
costs for individuals, communities, and the collective welfare.246
To repeat the point, people of color contract COVID-19 at higher
rates than whites and Black, Native Americans, and Latinx
COVID-19 patients are almost five times as likely to be
hospitalized—and two-to-three times as likely to die—as white
patients.247 The FDA’s policy perpetuates the disparities that,
as Ruqaiijah Yearby and Seema Mohapatra demonstrate, stem
from historic and current racism that cause and exacerbate
disparities in health care and health status.248
The ACOG brief invoked the social determinants of health
by emphasizing how inflexible workplaces, limited
transportation options, overcrowded housing, and pre-existing

245. Plaintiffs’ Amended and Corrected Memorandum of Law in Support
of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 17, Am. Coll. of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists v. FDA, 506 F. Supp. 3d 328 (D. Md. 2020) (No. 20-1320), 2020
WL 5700818.
246. See Paula Braveman et al., The Social Determinants of Health:
Coming of Age, 32 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 381, 388 (2011)
Coping with daily challenges can be particularly stressful when
one’s financial and social resources are limited. Recent evidence
implicates chronic stress in the causal pathways linking multiple
upstream
social
determinants
with
health,
through
neuroendocrine, inflammatory, immune, and/or vascular
mechanisms. Stressful experiencessuch as those associated with
social disadvantage, including economic hardship and racial
discriminationmay trigger the release of cortisol, cytokines, and
other substances that can damage immune defenses, vital organs,
and physiologic systems.
247. See supra note 244 and accompanying text; cf. Eona Harrison &
Ebonie Megibow, Three Ways COVID-19 is Further Jeopardizing Black
Maternal Health, URBAN INST. (July 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/D2TA-27TH.
248. See Yearby & Mohapatra, Systemic Racism, supra note 15, at 1422
(“Historically, the federal and state government’s legal and policy response to
pandemics has ignored these racial inequalities in employment and health
care, which are linked to racial inequities in infection and death.”).
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health conditions exacerbate longstanding inequalities.249 Social
determinants are the conditions that mediate the extent to
which people are exposed to health stressors and are able to
withstand them.250 Quality health care is one of the resources
that helps determine health, but the environments in which
people live, work, and learn also shape physical and mental
health.251 Determinants include limited education or nutrition,
preventable disease, unsafe water or work, poor sanitation,

249. See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Amended and Corrected Memorandum of Law,
supra note 245, at 22–23 (citing public health studies on racial disparities);
Cary P. Gross et al., Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Population-Level
Covid-19 Mortality, 35 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 3097, 309798 (2020) (reporting
racial disparities in COVID-19 mortality rates); Racial Data Transparency,
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV., https://perma.cc/9TL5-CD34 (last updated Mar. 12,
2021, 10:05 AM) (“Existing racial disparities in the rates of chronic medical
conditions increase the risk among ethnic minorities for serious complications
of the novel coronavirus and resulting higher death rates.”).
250. See Braveman et al., supra note 246, at 387–88 (linking education
attainment with social support which “may buffer the health-damaging effects
of stress” and also linking economic hardship and racial discrimination with
health-damaging stress); Bruce G. Link & Jo Phelan, Social Conditions as
Fundamental Causes of Disease, 35 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 80, 81 (1995)
(“[S]ome social conditions may be ‘fundamental causes’ of disease. A
fundamental cause involves access to resources, resources that help
individuals avoid diseases and their negative consequences through a variety
of mechanisms.”). See also Martha Fineman’s work on vulnerability theory,
Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in
the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 9 (2008)
Vulnerability initially should be understood as arising from our
embodiment, which carries with it the ever-present possibility of
harm, injury, and misfortune from mildly adverse to
catastrophically devastating events, whether accidental,
intentional, or otherwise. Individuals can attempt to lessen the risk
or mitigate the impact of such events, but they cannot eliminate
their possibility. Understanding vulnerability begins with the
realization that many such events are ultimately beyond human
control.
251. See Lindsay F. Wiley, From Patient Rights to Health Justice: Securing
the Public’s Interest in Affordable, High-Quality Health Care, 37 CARDOZO L.
REV. 833, 879 (2016) (“From a socially-situated, population health perspective,
access to health care is not an end in itself, but rather a means to improved
health at the individualas well as at the populationlevel.”). Social
determinants are the “cultural, social economic, ecological, and physical
circumstances that affect our health by shaping where and how we live, work,
learn, and play.” Angela P. Harris & Aysha Pamukcu, The Civil Rights of
Health: A New Approach to Challenging Structural Inequality, 67 UCLA L.
REV. 758, 768 (2020).

1408

78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1355 (2021)

inadequate income or access to health care, and substandard
housing, all of which correlate with shorter life expectancies and
poor health.252 Past and present discrimination and
subordination shape the social determinants of health that in
turn reproduce health disparities.253
Law is also a determinant that maintains and mediates the
social, economic, and physical structures shaping who suffers
and who thrives254 and distributing who has access to economic
and social resources.255 For instance, tax provisions, welfare,
and public assistance programs that strengthen economic
security are correlated with longer and healthier lives.256 Yet,

252. Social Determinants of Health: Key Concepts, WHO (May 7, 2013),
https://perma.cc/MU6K-WFN8; see Scott Burris, From Health Care Law to the
Social Determinants of Health: A Public Health Law Research Perspective, 159
U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1651 (2011) (exploring the importance of the social
determinants of health).
253. See generally INST. OF MED., UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING
RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE (2003) (finding that even with
equal access to health care, people of color continue to have poor health
outcomes across a range of indicators). Legal and de-facto racial segregation,
for example, force some populations of color to live in communities that have
significant problems with sanitation systems, exposure to toxins, or limited
access to nutritious foods. Carolette R. Norwood, Mapping the Intersections of
Violence on Black Women’s Sexual Health Within the Jim Crow Geographies
of Cincinnati Neighborhoods, 39 FRONTIERS 97, 97–98 (2018).
254. See Scott Burris et al., Integrating Law and Social Epidemiology, 30
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 510, 510 (describing how law is a social determinant of
health).
255. See O. B. K. Dingake, Letter to the Editor, The Rule of Law as a Social
Determinant of Health, 19 HEALTH HUM. RTS. 295, 297 (2017) (“The structural
determinants [including the governing process and legal policies] affect
whether the resources necessary for health are distributed equally in society,
or whether they are unjustly distributed according to race, gender, social class,
geography, sexual identity, or another socially defined group of people.”).
256. See Leonard E. Burman, Taxes and Inequality, 66 TAX L. REV. 563,
589–90 (2013) (“[T]he single most effective program at reducing poverty in
2010 was the EITC [Earned Income Tax Credit]. It reduced overall poverty
rates by 2 percentage points and the child poverty rate by 4.2 percentage
points. Overall, this single program cut child poverty by more than 20%.”);
Hilary W. Hoynes et al., Income, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and Infant
Health 30 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 18206, 2012) (“We
believe that these effects are largely due to the sizeable increase in income
[due to the Earned Income Tax Credit] for eligible families.”); Rachel Rebouché
& Scott Burris, The Social Determinants of Health, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
U.S. HEALTH LAW 1097, 1104 (I. Glenn Cohen et al. eds., 2016) (“Research on
the effects of tax credits indicates that the expansion of the earned income tax
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often courts have overlooked social determinants by reasoning
that law (and the state) did not create poverty, or that the
relationship between law and health disparities is too
attenuated.257 That limited view of law “reinscribes underlying
inequalities, while appearing to act neutrally and without
reference to categories of race, sex, or poverty.”258 By contrast,
the ACOG litigation highlights the impact of law when it
constricts abortion services, not only on patients and
populations of patients, but also for the broader project of
dismantling systemic inequalities.259 In the same vein, a social
determinants approach recognizes that addressing health
inequalities requires structural and institutional change.260
The ACOG case suggests one way to frame abortion
restrictions as threats to public health and the healthcare
system, both with respect to COVID-19 and chronic

credit (EITC) correlates with better overall health behaviors and lower rates
of depression among mothers and children that are EITC beneficiaries.”).
257. Supreme Court cases that uphold bans on abortion funding are
examples. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 298 (1980) (“Although
government may not place obstacles in the path of a woman’s exercise of her
freedom of choice, it need not remove those not of its own creation, and
indigency falls within the latter category.”); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474
(1977) (stating that Connecticut’s law banning Medicaid funding for elective
abortion did not cause poverty and thus was not the reason low-income people
could not afford abortion); see also Khiara Bridges, Elision and Erasure: Race,
Class, and Gender in Harris v. McRae, in REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS & JUSTICE
STORIES 127 (Melissa Murray et al. eds., 2019) (“[A]lthough concerns about
race, class, and gender drove much of the debate about Medicaid funding for
abortion, precedent (and politics) counseled those who challenged the Hyde
Amendment to downplay or ignore these elements in their legal
arguments. And in its opinion, the Court also elided these issues.”).
258. Hill, supra note 196, at 1125.
259. See supra Part II.C.
260. See Daphne McGee & Drew Stevens, Law as a Social Determinant of
Health and the Pursuit of Health Justice, AM. HEALTH LAW ASS’N (Aug. 21,
2020), https://perma.cc/99VQ-FSDC (“[T]he health law community should also
prioritize a ‘Health in All Policies’ approach . . . . [which] is defined as an
approach to public policies and governance across all sectors to ‘systematically
address the health and health-system implications of decisions, seek
synergies, and avoid harmful health impacts.’” (internal citations omitted));
Raj C. Shah & Sarah R. Kamensky, Health in All Policies for Government:
Promise, Progress, and Pitfalls to Achieving Health Equity, 69 DEPAUL L. REV.
757, 763 (2020) (stating that the “Health in All Policies” framework includes
“creating structural or procedural change on how government works by
embedding health and equity into all levels of government decision-making”).
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disparities.261 But relying on courts is fraught terrain as the
Supreme Court made clear in its order in ACOG.262 The next
Part discusses how abortion rights have come under pressure
with the Supreme Court poised to overrule or reinterpret
Planned Parenthood v. Casey. Notwithstanding the precarious
future of constitutional abortion rights, the next generation of
abortion policy may have less to do with courts and more to do
with political action that advances innovative practices and
technologies in the pursuit of abortion access.
III. A POST-ROE COUNTRY
The first subpart of this Part considers an imminent future
when federal constitutional rights to abortion have been further
eviscerated. The second subpart contemplates two ways by
which the delivery of care is evolving, with or without
constitutional rights to abortion—remote abortion care and
self-managed abortion. The Article concludes by assessing
potential strategies that movements for reproductive justice and
health justice might advance to ensure abortion access.
A.

With Roe: Betting on Burdens

The constitutional right to abortion has been under siege
for decades.263 However, Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood
v. Casey have stood even though numerous cases and laws have
chipped away at their legal force.264 The constitutional right to
abortion will continue to exist for some indeterminate period,

261. See supra Part II.C.
262. See supra notes 164–170 and accompanying text.
263. See Mary Ziegler, What’s Next for Abortion Law?, BOSTON REV. (Sept.
1, 2020), https://perma.cc/6HPM-35GK (detailing the unraveling of abortion
rights since Roe v. Wade); Elizabeth Nash & Lauren Cross, 2021 Is on Track
to Become the Most Devastating Antiabortion State Legislative Session in
Decades, GUTTMACHER INST. (Apr. 30, 2021), https://perma.cc/PWY4-9JPL (last
updated June 14, 2021) (“Due to the numbing effect from the onslaught of
abortion restrictions enacted over the past 10 years, the level of damage to
abortion rights and access may not be immediately apparent.”).
264. This Part refers to a “post-Roe” country, even though the Court would
reverse Casey, because the phrase tracks popular writing and public
perception.
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and, for the time being, the application of the undue burden test
is unclear.265
Amid doctrinal uncertainty, the present choice for state
courts remains between evidence that demonstrates the
multilevel burdens imposed by law, or deference to the
legislature.266 Some states are counting on the latter. As one
state representative from South Carolina put it, “[a] lot of what
state legislatures do on the issue of abortion is guided by what
federal courts have allowed . . . [a]nd it seems like the envelope
has been pushed a little further.”267
The implications of taking one path versus the other are
considerable. To take an example, the same week that the
Supreme Court handed down June Medical Services, it ordered
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to reconsider
appellate decisions that invalidated two abortion restrictions
from Indiana.268 One of the laws required patients to wait
eighteen hours between having a state-mandated ultrasound
and an abortion procedure.269
In its 2018 decision, the Seventh Circuit employed a
“context specific” analysis of the law’s effects and purposes
based on “the evidence in the record—including expert
evidence.”270 The court described the costs imposed by making

265. See supra Part I.
266. This Article does not argue that either path—evidence or
deference—is apolitical or neutral. These are strategies that reflect the larger
legal, social context in which evidence is generated. See Ahmed, Medical
Evidence and Expertise, supra note 117, at 118 (calling for a critique of
evidence and expertise in health law advocacy because “progressive lawyers
cannot presuppose the stability of public health, scientific, and medical
expertise and evidence as a foundation for pro-choice activism”).
267. Scott S. Greenberger, Trump-Appointed Judges Fuel Abortion Debate
in the States, PEW (Jan. 25, 2021), https://perma.cc/HCF4-RPYM (quoting
Republican State Senator Larry Grooms of South Carolina).
268. Rachel Rebouché, Opinion, Abortion Restrictions After June Medical
Services, REG. REV. (Aug. 4, 2020), https://perma.cc/45ZY-HE8J.
269. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r of the Ind. State
Dep’t of Health, 896 F.3d 809, 81213 (7th Cir. 2018) (describing the statutory
requirements). The other law required parental notice of minors’ abortion
decisions—even if the minor had received a judicial order circumventing
parental involvement—unless such notice was contrary to the minor’s best
interests. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Box, 991 F.3d 740, 742
(7th Cir. 2021).
270. Comm’r of the Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 896 F.3d at 818.
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two trips to the handful of clinics located across the state that
perform ultrasounds and abortions.271 The ultrasound waiting
period would result in “additional travel expenses, child-care
costs, loss of entire days’ wages, risk of losing jobs, and potential
danger from an abusive partner,” all of which represent
significant burdens on individuals who are seeking abortion.272
The Seventh Circuit specifically recounted expert testimony
from the district court record that explained “the impact of the
new law on these interconnected stressors and on the already
precarious financial lives of poor women seeking an abortion.”273
The Seventh Circuit found no credible evidence that the
waiting period was medically necessary or created opportunities
for patients’ meaningful reflection.274 The State of Indiana
offered only one study claiming that abortion correlated with
“moderate to highly increased psychological problems,” a study
the Seventh Circuit described as “controversial and much
maligned.”275 The Seventh Circuit ultimately did not reconsider
the case; the court remanded the case to the district court but
the parties settled in the fall of 2020 after Planned Parenthood
acquired additional ultrasound equipment.276
An undue burden standard (or any standard that replaces
it) that accords states wide discretion to enact laws with no
health benefits has implications for legislative responses to the
271. Id. at 815, 817.
272. Id. at 827.
273. Id. at 819. The court noted the incomes of Indiana’s abortion patients:
56 percent had incomes below 200 percent of the federal poverty line. Id. at
815.
274. See id. at 828 (stating that the state’s argument that the
waiting-period “gives women time for deeper reflection” is unsupported by the
evidence).
275. Id. at 826.
276. The Seventh Circuit remanded the case to the district court on
September 30, 2020. See Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r of
the Ind. Dep’t of Health, 823 F. App’x 440, 441 (7th Cir. 2020); Kyra Howard,
Indiana Pre-Abortion Ultrasound Law Goes Into Effect After Four-Year Wait,
STATEHOUSE FILE (Jan. 22, 2021), https://perma.cc/UPU6-RQFW
Planned Parenthood agreed to drop the lawsuit challenging the
Indiana bill in August 2020, allowing the bill to come into effect in
January 2021. . . . One possible reason Planned Parenthood ended
the lawsuit is because it obtained new ultrasound equipment at the
Fort Wayne clinic. The group also cited ‘events’ over the last three
years but did not go into detail.
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pandemic and beyond.277 In the spring of 2020, five federal
courts of appeal reviewed state actions that suspended abortion
care by deeming it a nonessential medical service.278 Those
decisions produced mixed results: two appellate courts deferred
to the states and three struck down the suspensions.279 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the Texas
executive order barring all abortion, including medication
abortion.280 Citing a Supreme Court case decided in 1905,
Jacobson v. Massachusetts,281 the Fifth Circuit held that a court
may not “second-guess” any state’s regulatory response to a
public health emergency.282 The Eighth Circuit, repeating the
Fifth Circuit’s reasoning, upheld Arkansas’s abortion
suspension and rejected evidence that the order failed to
conserve health resources or impede the spread of COVID-19.283
Both circuit courts dismissed arguments about the short-term
and long-term costs to individuals and the healthcare system as
mere “policy” considerations.284
One lesson from the suspensions and courts’ debate over the
application of June Medical Services is that location continues
to matter a great deal. Depending on the circuit, some courts
277. See Rachel Rebouché, Abortion Opportunism, 7 J.L. & BIOSCI. 1, 26
(2020) (explaining the implications of In re Abbott, which include unnecessary
and extraneous use of medical resources by people unable to induce abortion
remotely).
278. See id. at 2–9 (discussing opinions from the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,
Eighth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal).
279. For appellate courts deferring to states, see In re Abbott, 954 F.3d
772, 77779 (5th Cir. 2020); In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018, 103032 (8th Cir.
2020). For appellate courts striking down abortion suspensions, see Adams &
Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, 956 F.3d 913, 929 (6th Cir. 2020); Robinson v. Att’y Gen.,
957 F.3d 1171, 118384 (11th Cir. 2020); Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky.,
Inc. v. Box, 991 F.3d 740, 75152 (7th Cir. 2021).
280. See Rebouché, Abortion Opportunism, supra note 277, at 2–3
(discussing In re Abbott).
281. 197 U.S. 11 (1905). The Supreme Court in Jacobson wrote that
legislators can choose the means by which they exercise emergency health
authority unless the “regulations [are] so arbitrary and oppressive . . . as to
justify the interference of the courts to prevent wrong and oppression.” Id. at
38.
282. In re Abbott, 954 F.3d at 777–79. In January 2021, the Supreme Court
vacated the Fifth Circuit’s decision as moot. Planned Parenthood Ctr. for
Choice v. Abbott, 141 S. Ct. 1261 (2021).
283. In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d at 1030–32.
284. In re Abbott, 954 F.3d at 784; In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d at 1028–29.
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will affirm the multitude of ways that abortion restrictions
exacerbate existing health disparities and inequalities.285
Others will not.286 If courts apply Chief Justice Roberts’s
approach moving forward, some abortion regulations could fall
whenever legal restrictions put abortion services too far out of
reach for an undetermined number of patients—matters of
degree and determined by the facts.287 Other anti-abortion
statutes that do not shut clinic doors or excessively increase
travel distances for patients may stand.288
Another take away from the abortion suspensions early in
the pandemic, however, is the unexpected malleability of state

285. See supra notes 270–275 and accompanying text.
286. As noted above, many of the same states defending the FDA’s
in-person requirement for mifepristone have expanded telemedicine across
numerous health care sectors. See supra notes 138–140 and accompanying
text. Justice Sotomayor emphasized a similar point in her dissent from the
Court’s ACOG order. See FDA v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
141 S. Ct. 578, 580 (2021) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
The Government has thus recognized that in-person healthcare
during the COVID-19 pandemic poses a significant risk to patients’
health, and it has acted to help patients ‘access healthcare they
need from their home, without worrying about putting themselves
or others at risk during the COVID-19 outbreak.’ Yet the
Government has refused to extend that same grace to women
seeking medication abortion.
287. See June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2138 (2020)
(Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“Casey discussed benefits in considering the
threshold requirement that the State have a ‘legitimate purpose’ and that the
law be ‘reasonably related to that goal.’” (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992))).
288. Consider so-called fetal discrimination statutes, which ban abortions
that are motivated by the fetus’s sex, race, or prenatal diagnosis (for example,
Down syndrome). See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-04.1 (2021) (barring
physicians from performing abortions if they have knowledge that their
patient is seeking an abortion based on the fetus’s sex or a prenatal diagnosis).
Laws that attempt to restrict the reason for abortion are increasingly popular,
and although reason-based bans do not drive providers out of business, they
can deter people from seeking services or chill the care offered by providers— in
the name of respecting potential life, not protecting patient health. See Rachel
Rebouché, Testing Sex, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 519, 521 (2015) (“Before 2011, only
two states prohibited sex-selective abortion. Six states have since passed
sex-selective abortion bans and almost half of the country’s state legislatures
have considered similar bills.”). The Sixth Circuit upheld an Ohio law that
prohibits providers from terminating pregnancies because of a fetal diagnosis
of Down syndrome. See Preterm-Cleveland v. McCloud, 994 F.3d 512, 535 (6th
Cir. 2021).
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policy.289 The state suspensions undermined the typical
argument that abortion is different from all other healthcare
services—in twelve states, an overly-regulated procedure
became a non-essential service, like cosmetic surgery.290
Distinctions between essential and non-essential care, including
abortion, ceased to matter when states like Texas sought to
reopen businesses, essential or not, in the spring of 2020.291
Even given the exceptional circumstances, the course of
pandemic suspensions illustrate that states will bend to political
pressure or compromise anti-abortion stances for other
legislative priorities, which are policy decisions that do not
hinge on constitutional rights.
The proposal to decenter constitutional arguments is not
new.292 Yet the intersection of developments in legal doctrine,
judicial personnel, public health evidence, and social activism
has yielded new research-based, politically-focused action with
respect to abortion access. In that vein, the next subpart
explores the growth of and obstacles to teleabortion and
self-managed abortion. Again, public health evidence has played
289. See B. Jessie Hill, What Is the Meaning of Health? Constitutional
Implications of Defining “Medical Necessity” and “Essential Health Benefits”
Under the Affordable Care Act, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 445, 44647 (2012)
(discussing the political and legal issues surrounding the definitions of
essential health care and medical necessity).
290. See Rebouché, Abortion Opportunism, supra note 277, at 9
(“Contradictory treatment of abortion compared to other outpatient services
existed long before COVID-19 . . . . Abortion restrictions are ‘more numerous
and more stringent’ than regulations of other types of office-based procedures.”
(internal citation omitted)).
291. See Patrick Svitek, Gov. Greg Abbott to Let Restaurants, Movie
Theaters and Malls Open with Limited Capacity Friday, TEXAS TRIB. (Apr. 27,
2020), https://perma.cc/A645-FL4Z (last updated Apr. 28, 2020) (describing the
re-opening of nonessential businesses in Texas).
292. The reproductive justice movement has called for reproductive rights
advocates to focus less on litigating a right to an abortion and to retrain their
sights on community and political engagement, both for abortion access and
for a range of reproductive and sexual services. See Zakiya Luna & Kristin
Luker, Reproductive Justice, 9 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 327, 341–43 (2013)
(stating that the reproductive justice strategies include advocacy for reducing
racial and class disparities in criminal sentencing and healthcare); Rachel
Rebouché, Reproducing Rights: The Intersection of Reproductive Justice and
Human Rights, 7 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 579, 595 (2017) (“[R]ather than focusing
on litigating privacy rights, reproductive justice prioritizes community
engagement with vulnerable populations of women, and focuses on the
experiences of those living under abortion laws.”).
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a role, investigating and confirming the safety and efficacy of
teleabortion and self-managed abortion.293 Studies generated by
TxPEP and ANSIRH, to take Part II’s examples, have been at
the forefront of this research, not just to support the expansion
of abortion services, but also to promote cultural acceptance of
and investment in reproductive healthcare.294
B.

Without Roe: From Rights to Resources

Even though Roe has survived for decades, its reversal
seems more possible than at any other time. Already in 2021,
nine states have passed laws prohibiting abortion for almost all
reasons and well before viability; all but one of those laws are
not in effect at the time of writing.295 As noted, the Supreme
Court will decide whether all pre-viable prohibitions on elective
terminations are unconstitutional in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s
293. Take the work of Plan C and Gynuity as examples. See Patrick
Adams, Opinion, Amid Covid-19, a Call for M.D.s to Mail the Abortion Pill,
N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2020), https://perma.cc/E8Z2-SRCK
When they started Plan C in 2016, Ms. Wells and Ms. Coeytaux—
who in the late 1990s were instrumental in making emergency
contraception available over the counter—set out to raise
awareness about self-managed abortion through a grass-roots
approach. They held meetings in their homes, trained groups of
millennial “ambassadors,” and put out a report card ranking the
various vendors offering pills online. While Plan C was getting the
word out, the nonprofit research group Gynuity Health Projects was
gathering evidence for advocacy efforts aimed at removing the
regulation.
294. See SANGER, supra note 7, at 230–33 (arguing that technology, such
as telemedicine, and “current events,” or “the unexpected vagaries of modern
life that sometimes cause people to reconsider a position,” can “normalize” and
support abortion care).
295. Nash & Cross, supra note 263. Texas passed a so-called “heartbeat
statute,” which prohibits abortion after a provider detects fetal cardiac activity
or approximately six weeks after the first day of the patient’s last menstrual
period. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.204 (West 2021). The statute
is unique in that it places the law’s enforcement in the hands of private
citizens, who can sue providers and all who aid and abet an abortion in
violation of the law, rather than state officials. Id. § 171.201. The law took
effect on September 1, 2021, and has been the subject of multiple state and
federal lawsuits. Mary Ziegler & Rachel Rebouché, The Federal Suit Against
Texas’s Abortion Law May Fail. It’s Still Worthwhile, WASH. POST,
https://perma.cc/52JL-UEQR (Sept. 11, 2021, 6:00 AM); Ashley Lopez, Federal
Appeals Court Temporarily Reinstates Texas’s 6-Week Abortion Ban, NPR (Oct.
8, 2021, 10:06 PM), https://perma.cc/YCH5-P2J4.

THE PUBLIC HEALTH TURN

1417

Health Organization.296 If the Court upholds Mississippi’s
fifteen-week ban and permits some or all pre-viability
restrictions, there may be little left of the constitutional right to
abortion as set out in Roe and Casey.
The picture of abortion access, however, is already stark.
Currently, six states have one abortion provider.297 In addition,
providers are increasingly concentrated in urban areas, creating
“abortion deserts,” mostly in the Midwest and South, in which
there are no providers within one hundred miles of many of a
state’s residents.298 The Guttmacher Institute found that of the
“808 clinic facilities that provided 95% of abortions in 2017” only
26 percent of abortion facilities are in hostile states.299 But “58%
of American women of reproductive age lived in a state
considered either hostile or extremely hostile to abortion rights”
and “[o]nly 30% of women lived in a state supportive of abortion
rights.”300 The critical shortage of abortion services in many
parts of the country will worsen if constitutional rights to
abortion disappear.301 If the Court abandons Casey, twenty-one
states have laws in place or plan to pass laws that would make

296. 141 S. Ct. 2619 (2021).
297. Holly Yan, These 6 States Have Only 1 Abortion Clinic Left. Missouri
Could Become the First with Zero, CNN (June 21, 2019, 12:48 PM),
https://perma.cc/JG7R-57Q5.
298. See Raymond et al., supra note 144, at 174 (“27 cities with populations
of 50,000 or more had no abortion clinic within a 100 mile radius.”); Lisa R.
Pruitt & Marta R. Vanegas, Urbanormativity, Spatial Privilege, and Judicial
Blind Spots in Abortion Law, 30 BERKELEY J. GENDER, L. & JUST. 76, 7980
(2015) (discussing the unique impacts anti-abortion laws have on women
living in rural areas).
299. Witwer et al., supra note 212, at 4.
300. Elizabeth Nash et al., Policy Trends in the States, 2017, GUTTMACHER
INST. (Feb. 1, 2018), https://perma.cc/TTH7-5QBS. The Guttmacher Institute
defined “hostile” and “supportive”: “A state is considered supportive of abortion
rights if it has no more than one [abortion] restriction[], a middle-ground state
if it has 2–3, a hostile state if it has 4–5 and an extremely hostile state if it has
6–10.” Id. Six states were coded as hostile and twenty-three states as
extremely hostile; twelve states as supportive; and nine as middle ground. Id.
The types of laws analyzed included waiting periods, mandatory ultrasounds,
parental involvement requirements, gestational limits, and reason-based
bans, to name several. Id.
301. See COHEN & JOFFE, supra note 8, at 54–68 (detailing the scarcity of
providers and clinics and documenting the hardships both impose on patients).
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abortion a crime with limited exceptions.302 A study mapped
what abortion provision would look like if states likely to ban
abortion post-Roe did so.303 Caitlin Myers, Rachel Jones, and
Ushma Upadhyay found that “the average resident is expected
to experience a 249 mile increase in travel distance, and the
abortion rate is predicted to fall by 32.8%.”304 Travel is and will
remain necessary for the majority of people seeking abortion
care unless care becomes untethered to place.305
The remote delivery of medication abortion, though far from
a perfect solution, has expanded the geographical reach of
abortion care.306 Over half of the country’s states permit or have
no law restricting telemedicine for abortion.307 The Supreme
Court’s stay in ACOG thwarted some efforts to expand remote

302. Abortion Policy in the Absence of Roe, GUTTMACHER INST.,
https://perma.cc/Y44P-58Q9 (last updated July 1, 2021).
303. Caitlin Myers et al., Predicted Changes in Abortion Access and
Incidence in a Post-Roe World, 100 CONTRACEPTION 367, 369 (2019).
304. Id. at 367. Myers’s study found an increase from a national average
of twenty-five miles to 122 miles to a provider if Roe were overruled because
26 percent of people would live further than 200 miles from a clinic, and the
most affected people would be those living in urban Southern or Midwestern
areas who would be thirty miles away from a provider instead of five miles
away. Id. at 372. The study predicts that abortion rates would decline as much
as 40 percent in urban areas. Id.
305. Touching on a longstanding debate among legal academics, there are
mixed views about whether states could limit residents from seeking abortion
outside of state lines. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., If Roe Were Overruled:
Abortion and the Constitution in a Post-Roe World, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 611,
627 (2007) (hypothesizing that state statutes criminalizing the procurement of
out-of-state abortion by residents would be unconstitutional); Susan Frelich
Appleton, Gender, Abortion, and Travel after Roe’s End, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
655, 655–57 (2007) (arguing that Fallon’s analysis “would prove highly
problematic” and that states could instead use civil remedies as a deterrent for
out-of-state abortions); Seth F. Kreimer, “But Whoever Treasures
Freedom . . .”: The Right to Travel and Extraterritorial Abortions, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 907, 91421 (1993) (arguing that out-of-state abortion restrictions could
be deemed unconstitutional because they violate the Privileges and
Immunities or the Due Process clauses).
306. See Yvonne Lindgren, The Doctor Requirement: Griswold, Privacy,
and At-Home Reproductive Care, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 341, 346 (2017)
(arguing that people “living in poverty, of color, or with compromised
immigration status” may be more likely to self-induce abortion at home).
307. See Medication Abortion, supra note 24 (explaining that in-person
requirements “effectively ban[] telemedicine provision of medication abortion
despite clinical evidence that this practice is appropriate and safe”).
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care from January to April 2021.308 But the FDA’s decision to
suspend enforcement of the in-person ETASU until the end of
the COVID-19 emergency, just as the agency has done for other
drugs and while the FDA reviews the REMS, allowed virtual
clinics to resume operation.309
The Gynuity study, which was established before the
pandemic, as described in Part I, offers teleabortion services in
eighteen states and Washington, D.C.310 The first large-scale
308. See Rachel Rebouché & Ushma Upadhyay, Opinion, Online Clinics
Show Abortion Access Can Survive State Restrictions and Roe v. Wade Threat,
USA TODAY (Apr. 12, 2021, 5:01 AM), https://perma.cc/6AAL-FDUM (“At the
moment, these virtual clinics cannot use mail-order pharmacies to deliver
medications to their patients. That’s because in January, the Supreme Court
reinstated the FDA rule while litigation is ongoing.”); Rachel Rebouché, The
Supreme Court Doesn’t Hold All the Power When It Comes to Abortion Rights.
Here Are 2 Things the Biden Administration Can Do to Extend Access, TIME
(Dec. 22, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://perma.cc/8DUS-A3D5 (arguing that the Biden
Administration could remove FDA restrictions on teleabortion); Carrie N.
Baker, SCOTUS Blocks Access to Abortion Pill by Mail During Pandemic.
Advocates Look to Biden Administration to Reverse Trump Policy, MS. MAG.
(Jan. 13, 2021), https://perma.cc/T8VJ-JWGV (last updated Jan. 23, 2021)
(detailing the negative impacts of the FDA’s medication abortion regulation
enacted during the Trump Administration).
309. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 144. Those states are Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii,
Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana,
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Virginia, Washington,
and Washington, D.C. TelAbortion: Get Started, GYNUITY HEALTH PROJECTS,
https://perma.cc/5V7M-VV5L. Note that Montana’s teleabortion services may
be impacted by a 2021 law requiring in-person dispensation. Eric Wicklund,
Planned Parenthood Challenges Montana’s Ban on Telemedicine Abortions,
MHEALTH INTELLIGENCE (Aug. 17, 2021), https://perma.cc/M3HB-AF6V. In
2019, Gynuity partnered with carafem, which operates a telehealth program
for abortion, as well as four health centers in Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, and
Washington, D.C. See CARAFEM, 2020 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2020),
https://perma.cc/9YJF-NKP2 (PDF). Like ANSIRH and TxPEP, Gynuity
received substantial financial support from a large, private foundation. See
ZIEGLER, supra note 5, at 169 (“The Buffett Foundation alone provided $40
million to the Guttmacher Foundation and nearly $30 million to Gynuity
Health Projects.”). In addition to the states that Gynuity serves, Abortion on
Demand (AOD) offers virtual services in California, Connecticut, Delaware,
Rhode Island, and Vermont. Carrie N. Baker, Abortion on Demand Offers
Telemedicine Abortion in 20+ States and Counting: “I Didn’t Know I Could Do
This!”, MS. MAG. (June 7, 2021), https://perma.cc/L7GT-7QGZ (describing how
Abortion On Demand operates). The AOD website has announced expansion
to Hawaii, Idaho, Wyoming, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and New Hampshire.
Where is AOD Available?, ABORTION ON DEMAND, https://perma.cc/FV43-J752.
AOD prescribes medication abortion up to eight weeks of pregnancy, rather
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virtual clinic, Abortion on Demand, launched in April 2021 and
now operates in twenty states with plans to expand to
twenty-seven states in 2021.311 Virtual clinics like Abortion on
Demand are able to charge much less than brick-and-mortar
clinics312 and contract with online pharmacies to mail
medication abortion prescribed by licensed physicians.313
Another organization, Aid Access, works with physicians
certified to prescribe medication abortion and willing to mail the
regimen directly to patients. Aid Access operates in six states,
bringing the current number of states with teleabortion services
to twenty-three.314 Patient satisfaction surveys suggest that the
value of remote abortion care is what one could have
predicted— effective care with privacy, convenience, and
reduced delay and cost.315
Growth of virtual clinics appears to continue, not least
because of the FDA’s reconsideration of the REMS. The FDA
will base its decision on research provided in a supplemental new
drug application by the drug manufacturer and evidence from
published studies.316 The research centers described in this
than ten as allowed by the FDA, and only for people aged eighteen and older,
in order to avoid parental involvement restrictions. Id.
311. Other start-up clinics include Choix, Hey Jane, and Just the Pill. See
Rebouché & Upadhyay, supra note 308 (explaining the resiliency of abortion
rights as exampled by the new-wave of virtual abortion clinics, which may be
undeterred by “[n]ear-total bans on abortion”); Telephone Interview with
Jamie Phifer, Founder, Abortion on Demand (Aug. 3, 2021).
312. See Carrie N. Baker, How Telemedicine Startups Are Revolutionizing
Abortion Health Care in the U.S., MS. MAG. (Nov. 16, 2020),
https://perma.cc/Q9MS-KNRH (discussing the cost of abortions at virtual
clinics). Carrie Baker details how abortion funds help patients cover the cost
of medication abortion and several clinics use sliding scales for payment based
on patient income. See id.
313. See id. (noting that a district court judge “temporarily suspended an
FDA restriction” that allowed providers to send abortion pills through the mail
for a short time).
314. Aid Access offers its telemedicine services for abortion, in addition to
the states covered by Gynuity and carafem, to Arkansas, Connecticut, Indiana,
New Jersey, Nevada, and Vermont. Where We Operate, FAQs, AID ACCESS,
https://perma.cc/8BWQ-2WSQ.
315. See Rebouché & Upadhyay, supra note 308 (reporting that an ongoing
study has suggested that virtual clinic patients were “overwhelmingly
satisfied with [the] service” they received).
316. Joint Motion to Stay Case Pending Agency Review at 2, Chelius v.
Wright, No. 17-cv-493 (D. Haw. May 7, 2021), ECF No. 148.
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Article have been, and will be, the main source of those studies.317
That research, moreover, contributes to the work of advocates
and lawyers who disseminate information about how remote
medication abortion works.318 Plan C, a non-profit organization,
has been a hub for connecting patients with providers.319 And
Plan C disputes the dominant interpretation of the in-person
ETASU and argues that in-person collection is not required
because the FDA does not specify how mifepristone should be
dispensed.320 Even before the ACOG case, Plan C organizers
recruited physicians who received certification required by the
FDA and then interpreted the provision as allowing supervised
direct mail of mifepristone and misoprostol.321
The landscape of abortion has shifted in ways that many
thought unimaginable ten years before—that is, early
terminations without a visit to a clinic.322 But telemedicine for
abortion has clear limitations. The current regulation of
telemedicine for abortion mirrors the map of abortion access in
a post-Roe country. Laws in about half of the country limit,
explicitly or implicitly, telemedicine for abortion.323 For
instance, twenty states require a physician to be present upon

317. The work of ANSIRH, noted in Part II, is significant in establishing
the safety and efficacy of remote care. See Telemedicine for Abortion, ANSIRH,
https://perma.cc/HR4B-J67Y (providing accessible information regarding
abortion).
318. See Amna A. Akbar et al., Movement Law, 73 STAN. L. REV. 821, 847
(2021) (calling for legal scholars writing about law, justice, and social change
to co-generate ideas with social movements).
319. See Adams, supra note 293 (“[T]he pandemic has also shone a
spotlight on what’s known as ‘medication abortion,’ or the use of pills to
terminate an early pregnancy. And Ms. Coeytaux and Ms. Wells, [the creators
of Plan C], say that has only broadened support for their efforts to make the
medicines available by mail.”).
320. See The Plan C Guide to Getting Abortion Pills, PLAN C,
https://perma.cc/N62H-J28S (offering in-depth information on the process of
receiving and using medication abortion).
321. See Adams, supra note 293 (describing Plan C’s efforts to encourage
doctors to mail mifepristone to patients).
322. See Carole Joffe, A Rare Expansion in Abortion Access Because of
COVID-19, TIME (Sept. 28, 2020, 3:29 PM), https://perma.cc/Q47E-2K87.
323. See Medication Abortion, supra note 24. The ACOG decision did not
suspend the operation of state law and applied, in any case, through and for
thirty days after the COVID-19 national emergency. FDA v. Am. Coll. of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 141 S. Ct. 578, 580 (2021) (per curiam).
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delivery of medication abortion.324 Ten states ban the use of
telemedicine for abortion even though existing in-person
requirements would accomplish the same end; state courts in
two states have enjoined those in-person requirements.325
Moreover, patients need access to technology to make
teleabortion work. Based on the statistics about laptop and
tablet use, most abortion patients would likely use a
smartphone for remote care.326 Rules that require people to log
on from certain locations from specific devices, which is
dependent on broadband or wireless internet, may encumber
participation in telehealth visits.327
324. Medication Abortion Requirements, POL’Y SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
(Dec. 1, 2018), https://perma.cc/H4ZW-DCQV (last updated Mar. 1, 2021).
Montana passed legislation in May 2021 requiring in-person dispensation and
Ohio and Iowa state courts have enjoined the in-person requirement. See infra
note 325 and accompanying text.
325. See Medication Abortion Requirements, supra note 324 (noting that
Arizona, Texas, Arkansas, Iowa, Indiana, Kentucky, West Virginia, and South
Carolina have banned the use of telemedicine for medication abortion). West
Virginia has an exception for physicians with an existing relationship
established through an in-person encounter. See W. VA. CODE §§ 30-3-13a,
30-14-12d (2020). Iowa has a ban on telemedicine for abortion, but its
regulation of medication abortion, such as in-person administration, has been
enjoined by the Supreme Court of Iowa. See Planned Parenthood of the
Heartland, Inc. v. Iowa Bd. of Med., 865 N.W.2d 252, 269 (Iowa 2015).
Montana and Ohio recently passed telemedicine bans for abortion, but as of
May 2021, a state court temporarily enjoined the Ohio law. Iris Samuels,
Montana Governor Signs 3 Bills Restricting Abortion Access, AP NEWS (Apr.
26, 2021), https://perma.cc/2T77-Z62R; Carrie N. Baker, Advocates Cheer FDA
Review of Abortion Pill Restrictions, MS. MAG. (May 11, 2021),
https://perma.cc/5M8P-WPY5 (describing the Ohio law and state court
injunction).
326. carafem, a provider that operates a virtual clinic in addition to
physical locations in Atlanta, Nashville, Chicago, and Washington, DC,
designed an app, “Cara,” that helps schedule appointments, answers
questions, and provides a hotline to a healthcare provider. Mallory Hackett,
carafem Develops Text-Based Virtual Assistant for Patients Taking Abortion
Pill at Home, MOBI HEALTH NEWS (Apr. 14, 2021, 2:28 PM),
https://perma.cc/7PSQ-XVFD.
327. In addition, there are issues of privacy and “telefraud.” See Nathaniel
M. Lacktman et al., Top 5 Telehealth Law Predictions for 2021, NAT’L L. REV.
(Jan. 12, 2021), https://perma.cc/3FTY-L9BW (“HHS OIG and DOJ will
continue its [sic] takedown of companies engaged in ‘telefraud . . . .’”). Parity
in reimbursement is a significant issue, especially for Medicaid coverage of
telehealth. Id. The application of the Hyde Amendment and state restrictions
on funding for abortion services, however, complicate the issue for abortion
care.
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Although not the subject of this Article, state regulation can
ease or impede telehealth generally by allowing out-of-state
providers to offer telehealth services or by permitting the
patient-provider relationship to be established online or over the
telephone, to name two examples.328 Taking the former example,
over the course of the pandemic, numerous states relaxed
licensure requirements that normally restrict physicians from
practicing only in the state in which they offer services.329 Under
a licensure waiver or an interstate compact, an out-of-state
practitioner can counsel patients and prescribe medication
abortion online or over the phone if not otherwise prohibited by
state law.330

328. See OSUB AHMED, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, STATES MUST EXPAND
TELEHEALTH TO IMPROVE ACCESS TO SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH CARE
2 (2020), https://perma.cc/Q4ZK-4WTC (PDF) (“Regardless of the modality,
telehealth technology is critical to overcoming the geographical, financial, and
logistical barriers that many people face when trying to access [sexual and
reproductive health] care in person.”). As happened over the course of the
pandemic, states may waive licensure requirements to permit providers in
good standing in another state to practice within the state’s jurisdiction. See
Eli Y. Adashi et al., The Interstate Medical Licensure Compact: Attending to
the Underserved, 325 JAMA 1607, 1607 (2021) (“Telemedicine, which is likely
to become an enduring legacy of the COVID-19 pandemic, invariably is in
conflict with the interstate physician licensing process. This obstacle is being
progressively overcome by the Interstate Medical Licensure Compact (IMLC),
which has been rapidly gaining ground since . . . 2017.”). Licensure compacts
also allow physicians to prescribe medication to out-of-state residents.
Prescribing Controlled Substances via Telehealth, HEATH RES. & SERVS.
ADMIN., https://perma.cc/97K2-RBEG (last updated Jan. 28, 2021).
329. See Cason D. Schmit et al., Telehealth in the COVID-19 Pandemic, in
ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19 123, 128 (Scott Burris et al. eds.,
2020), https://perma.cc/QMR8-K7FW (PDF); Kyle Faget, Telehealth in the
Wake of COVID-19, 22 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 5, 8–9 (2020).
330. See Lacktman et al., supra note 327
In an effort to balance workload nationally and expand access to
health care practitioners during the Public Health Emergency
(PHE), many states temporarily suspended medical licensing
requirements. As these temporary waivers begin to sunset, some
state legislatures will seek to make the waivers permanent,
allowing practitioners licensed in other states to deliver telehealth
services across state lines, provided the out-of-state practitioner
follows local state practice standards. While this may be a topic of
discussion among policy shops, we expect few states will actually
enact such changes in 2021.
The Uniform Law Commission presently is drafting a Telehealth Act for state
adoption, which would create a national registry for out-of-state practitioners

1424

78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1355 (2021)

Patients also must meet the medical criteria for remote
services. Medication abortion is not recommended for people at
risk of an ectopic pregnancy, taking blood thinners or certain
steroids, and with blood disorders, pelvic inflammatory disease,
or severe anemia.331 People of color and low-income people are
more likely to have pregnancy complications and to have poorer
health, thereby reducing the chance, overall, that they can be
candidates for teleabortion.332 These are not only challenges for
remote care, but also mirror the disparities in U.S.
healthcare.333
Finally, medication abortion will not serve those seeking to
terminate pregnancies after ten weeks of pregnancy.334
Presently, almost 60 percent of abortion patients use
non-medication methods.335 Those procedures are tethered to

offering telehealth services. TELEHEALTH ACT (UNIF. L. COMM’N, Draft June 28,
2021), https://perma.cc/GD5R-QBHW. The draft Act, however, provides that
practitioners may offer services “not otherwise prohibited by law,” id. § 4, and
contemplates exclusion of abortion services in the Comment: “For example,
state statutes restricting or prohibiting the prescription of abortion-inducing
medications or other controlled substances through telehealth will continue to
apply.” Id. § 4 cmt.
331. See Medical Abortion, MAYO CLINIC, https://perma.cc/78AQ-J793.
332. See Harrison & Megibow, supra note 247 (describing the heightened
risks associated with pregnancy for Black people).
333. See Infant Health Mortality and African Americans, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. OFF. OF MINORITY HEALTH, https://perma.cc/UP95W4HH (finding the infant mortality rate among non-Hispanic Blacks/African
Americans to be 2.3 times the infant mortality rate among non-Hispanic
whites); NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G, & MED., METRICS THAT MATTER FOR
POPULATION HEALTH ACTION 54 (2016) (noting that there are pervasive health
inequities in the United States); Khiara M. Bridges, Racial Disparities in
Maternal Mortality, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1257–65, 1308–16 (2020)
(providing an overview of racial disparities in maternal mortality and calling
for policy changes that address the structural and institutional forces that
result in maternal deaths).
334. See Medication Abortion Up to 70 Days of Gestation, 136 ACOG PRAC.
BULL. e31, e32 (2020), https://perma.cc/B4E3-MTRU (PDF) (“Most patients at
70 days of gestation or less who desire abortion are eligible for a medication
abortion.”).
335. Ninety-two percent of abortions occur before thirteen weeks of
pregnancy and over 60 percent of all terminations are performed by removing
pregnancy tissue in the uterus by suction. PLANNED PARENTHOOD, ABORTION
AFTER THE FIRST TRIMESTER 1 (2014), https://perma.cc/93ZY-ZC6W (PDF); see
Surgical Abortion (First Trimester), UCSF HEALTH, https://perma.cc/L6TY87M9.
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clinical spaces, access to which becomes increasingly
complicated if a Supreme Court ruling permits states to ban
most abortions at any point in pregnancy.336
Self-managed abortion is another avenue for abortion care,
which also has been the subject of intensive study. An individual
self-manages abortion when they terminate a pregnancy
without direct health care provider supervision. Typically, the
two-drug regimen (or, sometimes, misoprostol only) is ordered
online from companies or organizations headquartered in other
countries.337 People report preferring self-managed abortion
because it provides more privacy and autonomy than abortions
conducted at a health facility.338 Substantial research has shown
that self-administration of medication abortion with proper
instruction is effective and comparably as safe as care
administered by professionals in clinical settings.339
Like teleabortion, research networks have produced studies
that support the expansion of self-managed abortions.340
Although the prevalence of self-managed abortion is challenging
to measure, surveys of health care providers and patients note
336. See Jill Wieber Lens, Miscarriage, Stillbirth, and Reproductive
Justice, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 1059, 1081 (“Some women, especially
marginalized women, may ‘choose’ to get an abortion, but that does not mean
that they can access one.”).
337. Chloe Murtagh et al., Exploring the Feasibility of Obtaining
Mifepristone and Misoprostol from the Internet, 97 CONTRACEPTION 287, 289
(2018). Aid Access offers U.S. residents an online consultation with a physician
residing in another country who, if the physician deems it safe to do so,
prescribes a regimen that a pharmacy, typically in India, fills and mails to the
patient. Consultation, AID ACCESS, https://perma.cc/9FZF-YYGE. In 2019,
21,000 U.S. women requested Aid Access’s help, and at least one-third were
served. Who Are We, AID ACCESS, https://perma.cc/6TG6-TP6L; see Hannah
Devlin, Revealed: 21,000 US Women Order Abortion Pills Online in Past Year,
GUARDIAN, https://perma.cc/FJY8-H6RR (May 22, 2019, 2:00 PM) (asserting
that Aid Access, in 2019, assisted between one-third and one-half of people
who requested help).
338. Mariana Prandini Assis & Sara Larrea, Why Self-Managed Abortion
Is So Much More than a Provisional Solution for Times of Pandemic, 28
SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 2, 38 (2020).
339. See id. (comparing self-administration of medication abortion to
medication abortion “administered by professionals in health facilities”).
340. See Abigail R. A. Aiken et al., Factors Associated with Use of an Online
Telemedicine Service to Access Self-Managed Medical Abortion in the US, 4
JAMA NETWORK OPEN 1, 1 (2021) (finding that increased access to medication
abortion might have the potential to expand access for those living below the
federal poverty level).

1426

78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1355 (2021)

that the practice has increased in recent years, specifically in
areas of the United States in which abortion access is heavily
circumscribed.341 Aid Access, which, as noted, provides
telehealth for abortion, also assists individuals to self-induce
abortion.342 Aid Access is directed by a physician, Rebecca
Gomperts, trained in the Netherlands, who has spearheaded
previous initiatives to deliver abortion services across the world
in the face of restrictive country laws.343 The organization offers
information about administering medication abortion and
procures prescriptions from U.S. or European healthcare
providers.344
Wider introduction of self-managed abortion faces
considerable obstacles too. For one, although self-managed
abortion is increasingly understood to be safe, concerns remain
that people underestimate their stage of pregnancy.345 For
another, and more significantly, providers and patients can be

341. See, e.g., Fuentes et al., supra note 203, at 205 (explaining that five of
the participants interviewed considered self-inducing abortion but did not
attempt it).
342. See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
343. See Rebecca Gomperts (Born 1966 in Vlissingen, Holland), MUSEUM
OF CONTRACEPTION & ABORTION (2020), https://perma.cc/4AR3-XY87
(highlighting Gomperts’s initiatives to combat restrictive abortion laws). The
FDA sent Aid Access a warning letter indicating that the organization may be
in violation of the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act. Letter from the FDA to
Aidaccess.org (Mar. 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/5EMU-EGFG.
344. See Carrie N. Baker, Why Order Abortion Pills Online? Affordability,
Privacy and Convenience, Says New Study, MS. MAG. (May 27, 2021),
https://perma.cc/B346-SYUY
Individuals make requests to Aid Access by filling out an online
consultation form. If patients live in Alaska, California,
Connecticut, Idaho, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York,
New Jersey, New Mexico, Nevada, Vermont and Washington, Aid
Access refers patients to doctors in their state. These patients pay
$150 and receive the medication within a few days. For patients
living in the remaining states, European-based physicians review
the consultation forms and provide medication to eligible patients
via an India-based pharmacy that mails the pills within two weeks
for a cost of $105. The Aid Access help desk is available to users at
any time during and after an abortion.
345. See Megan K. Donovan, Self-Managed Medication Abortion:
Expanding the Available Options for U.S. Abortion Care, 21 GUTTMACHER
POL’Y REV. 41, 44 (2018), https://perma.cc/J9UX-QAZF (PDF) (noting that the
“patients’ ability to self-assess eligibility” needs more evidence).
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punished under a variety of state laws.346 Six states have laws
that attempt to criminalize self-managed abortions and several
states have so-called fetal endangerment laws.347 Per the latter,
fetal endangerment laws originally targeted drug use by
pregnant people, but have been applied to a range of activities
including terminating a pregnancy.348 In states that do not have
346. See Aziza Ahmed, Floating Lungs: Forensic Science in Self-Induced
Abortion Prosecutions, 100 B.U. L. REV. 1111, 1116, 1121, 1124 (2020)
(analyzing the “intersection of pregnancy, abortion, and the carceral state in
the context of the broader critique of policing and mass incarceration”). Aziza
Ahmed has shown that prosecution of self-managed abortion depends on
“racialized and gendered assumptions that shape decision-making in the court
in finding that a woman ought to be punished for her behavior during or after
pregnancy.” Id. at 1137. It is beyond the scope of this Article to describe the
myriad ways in which pregnant individuals’ behavior is policed and punished.
But important scholarship describes how criminal law has been used to surveil
and punish providers and patients for their reproductive choices. See MICHELE
GOODWIN, POLICING THE WOMB: INVISIBLE WOMEN AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF
MOTHERHOOD 12–26 (2020) (discussing ways in which the law is harnessed to
punish reproductive behavior and choices).
347. See Farah Diaz-Tello, Roe Remains for Now . . . Will It Be Enough?,
ABA (Sept. 7, 2020), https://perma.cc/RC4E-CAN9 (discussing the Alabama
Supreme Court’s reinterpretation of a child endangerment law). For more
information on the legal landscape for self-managed abortion, see THE SIA
LEGAL TEAM, ROE’S UNFINISHED PROMISE: DECRIMINALIZING ABORTION ONCE
AND FOR ALL (2018), https://perma.cc/H635-B5BX (PDF). Fetal protection laws
promote the view that fetal life deserves protection separate from the pregnant
person. Id. at 5. Michele Goodwin writes that this “is significant as it
normalizes treating the unborn as if they had been born at the time of injury,
which not only implicates abortion policy, but also criminal law and other
constitutional interests.” Michele Goodwin, Fetal Protection Laws: Moral
Panic and the New Constitutional Battlefront, 102 CAL. L. REV. 791, 794 (2014).
348. See Lynn M. Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Arrests and Forced
Interventions of Pregnant Women in the United States 1973-2005: Implications
for Women’s Legal Status and Public Health, 38 J. HEALTH POLS., POL’Y & L.
299, 315 (2013). Megan Boone and Benjamin McMichael recently
demonstrated that fetal protection laws have had a statistically significant
negative impact on fetal and infant health:
Though ostensibly passed to protect fetuses (and later, infants)
from harm, this law does no such thing. In 2015 alone, the empirical
analysis shows that the law resulted in twenty fetal deaths and
sixty infant deaths. And the empirical results suggest a
well-defined mechanism by which these deaths occurred. Mothers
forego prenatal care when this law is in place—indeed, the chilling
effect of such law on pregnant mothers lasts past the time the law
lapses—which places them and their fetuses at higher risk.
Meghan M. Boone & Benjamin J. McMichael, State Created Fetal Harm, 109
GEO. L.J. 475, 507 (2021).

1428

78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1355 (2021)

fetal endangerment laws, police and prosecutors could apply
other criminal laws to target people who self-manage
abortion.349 Feticide or solicitation of murder laws, for example,
have been applied to punish self-managed abortion, although
the frequency of such prosecutions is hard to gauge.350
The barriers to remote care are significant, but not
insurmountable. While there are obstacles to telehealth for
abortion care and self-managed abortion, there has also been
support for pro-abortion policies. On the federal level, the Biden
Administration has expressed a “commit[ment] to codifying Roe
v. Wade.”351 The proposed Women’s Health Protection Act352
offers one option, which the House of Representatives passed on
September 24, 2021.353 The Act protects providers’ right to offer
services and patients’ right to receive care; the bill also would
limit what restrictions states can pass.354 Specifically, the Act
preempts state restrictions on telemedicine, unless the
restriction is generally applicable, as well as in-person
requirements unless the in-person visit is medically
necessary.355

349. See Diaz-Tello, supra note 347 (describing individuals being “charged
with felonies like concealment of a birth, practicing pharmacy without a
license, or even homicide”).
350. Ahmed, supra note 346, at 1123. By one account, twenty-one people
over the last twenty years have been prosecuted for self-managed abortion,
although commentators suspect that is a vast underestimate. See Diaz-Tello,
supra note 347 (highlighting that legally, abortion has become riskier as
people in the United States have been arrested and charged with felonies for
ending pregnancy on their own).
351. See Press Release, supra note 3 (“We are deeply committed to making
sure everyone has access to . . . reproductive healthcare—regardless of
income, race, zip code, health insurance status, or immigration status.”); Kate
Smith, Biden Pledged to Make Roe v. Wade “The Law of the Land,” CBS NEWS
(Oct. 6, 2020, 4:55 PM), https://perma.cc/NNG4-GG5Q (noting that, during the
election, the Biden campaign promised to codify Roe if the Supreme Court
abandoned abortion rights).
352. Women’s Health Protection Act of 2019, H.R. 2975, 116th Cong.
(2019).
353. Daniella Diaz et al., House Passes Bill Preserving the Right to
Abortion, CNN (Sept. 24, 2021, 1:01 PM), https://perma.cc/E7N8-8W7S.
354. H.R. 2975, § 4(a)–(b).
355. Id. § 4(a)(5), (7). But see Teleabortion Prevention Act of 2019, H.R.
4935, 116th Cong. (2019) (requiring in-person administration of medication
abortion).
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On the state level, legislation can ensure abortion rights
within a jurisdiction.356 Massachusetts passed the ROE Act,
which provides a state right to abortion for any reason before
twenty-four weeks of pregnancy, and for reason of life, health,
or lethal fetal anomaly after twenty-four weeks.357 Virginia, once
a state with only anti-abortion laws, repealed its ban on abortion
coverage in private health care plans offered through the state’s
health insurance exchange.358
Changing state law depends on political organizing. The
lawyers, advocates, and researchers described here have
supported increased abortion access through the political
process, but not just for the sake of protecting an individual
choice or defending an abstract right.359 Rather, their work is in
conversation with networks that seek abortion access as an
issue of economic and racial justice.360 Those networks are
committed to principles grounded in reproductive justice and
health justice, which share commitments to empowering
communities and to the fairer redistribution of resources.361
356. See, e.g., ROE Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, §§ 12F, K–U (2021); id.
ch. 118E, § 10E.
357. Id. As noted, Massachusetts is not the first state to enact legislation
to protect abortion rights. Fourteen states and the District of Columbia have
laws that protect the right to abortion, either throughout pregnancy (D.C.,
Oregon, and Vermont) or prior to viability (and then after when necessary to
protect the life or health of the pregnant person) (California, Connecticut,
Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New
York, Rhode Island, Washington). See Abortion Policy in the Absence of Roe,
supra note 302.
358. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3451 (2021).
359. Research studies described herein are models of “participatory action
research,” or using the “tools of social science to treat movement actors and
activists as research partners in the generation of questions and answers
about the world.” Akbar et al., supra note 318, at 863 n.176. In a similar vein,
and in the context of reproductive justice, Zakiya Luna and Kristin Luker have
called for interviews and participatory techniques in research “from design to
execution to publication to evaluation.” Luna & Luker, supra note 292, at 344.
360. “What would it look like to design a policy around the idea that no one
should have to choose abortion because she is too poor to have a child? It would
cost billions of dollars. Yet, we routinely spend such sums on the war over
abortion’s legality.” MICHELLE OBERMAN, HER BODY, OUR LAWS: ON THE FRONT
LINES OF THE ABORTION WAR, FROM EL SALVADOR TO OKLAHOMA 141 (2018).
361. Angela P. Harris and Aysha Pamukcu note three commitments
shared among social justice movements: “(1) a commitment to acknowledging
the centrality and complexity of subordination; (2) an understanding of the
necessity yet insufficiency of legal advocacy and technical knowledge alone to
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Health justice and reproductive justice, however, are not always
in conversation with one another.
Health justice is a framework that “addresses the social
determinants of health that result in poor health for individuals
and consequential negative outcomes for society at large.”362
And health justice scholarship emphasizes collective action as
key to dismantling disparities and inequalities.363 Angela Harris
and Aysha Pamukcu described the likeminded goals of
reproductive justice:
The reproductive justice movement was similarly founded as
a response to the reproductive rights . . . . [and] its focus on
protecting the individual right to abortion, [which] failed to
challenge racially and financially differentiated access to
reproductive health . . . . Reproductive justice advocates
thus defined their mission around the need to identify the
institutional and structural forms of discrimination that
prevent all women from equally enjoying the right to bear
and raise healthy children, in addition to the right to choose
not to have a child.364

redress subordination; and (3) a commitment to, through social movement
organizing,
centering
state
and
market
governance
around
broadly-articulated ‘life rights.’” Harris & Pamukcu, supra note 251, at 806,
808 (internal citation omitted).
362. Emily Benfer, Health Justice: A Framework (and Call to Action) for
the Elimination of Health Inequity and Social Injustice, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 275,
278 (2015).
363. Lindsay Wiley proposes four key commitments for health justice:
First, the health justice model asserts the importance of collective
interests, alongside individual interests, in decisions about medical
treatment. Second, the health justice model emphasizes that
universal access to affordable health care protects collective, as well
as individual, interests. Third, because “upstream” prevention
strategies have greater population-level impact, the health justice
model prioritizes prevention and integration of health care with
public health. Fourth, the health justice model asserts the role of
collective oversight through democratic governance—much in the
same way that the market power model champions the role of
private payers and market dynamics—in managing resources and
securing common goods.
Wiley, supra note 251, at 833.
364. Harris & Pamukcu, supra note 251, at 809. Harris and Pamukcu call
for a health justice framework that combines public health expertise on the
social determinants of health, civil rights, legal principles on equality and
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Synthesizing the work of various social justice campaigns,
Harris and Pamukcu call for a convergence of civil rights, social
determinants, and health justice to work toward “a world in
which your wealth, your social status, your access to power, and
your zip code are irrelevant to your life expectancy or
vulnerability to illness.”365 In other words, where people live
should not dictate whether they can obtain abortion care.
Health justice and reproductive justice emphasize the
limitations of strategies concerned only with the right to buy a
service and support policies that lower or eliminate the costs of
care, make child rearing more affordable, and address the
country’s tattered healthcare system.366 Such measures would
include, but also go beyond, those specifically designed to
expand abortion services.367 So in addition to lifting funding
bans or providing financial support for abortion facilities in
underserved areas, for example,368 responsive policy reform
would mean support for higher wages, accessible healthcare,
secure housing, and other interventions that upend inequality.
In short, health justice and reproductive justice share a
commitment to advancing policies that respond to the social
determinants of health.
CONCLUSION
U.S. abortion law, politics, and practice are approaching an
important pivot point that could affect the reproductive health
and wellbeing of the next generation or more. It is unclear how
things will work out in the terrain of national politics, given the
liberty, and a social movement focus on challenging power structures. Id. at
806.
365. Id. at 766.
366. The proposed Equal Access to Abortion Coverage in Health Insurance
(EACH Woman) Act would require coverage for abortion care through public
health insurance programs (such as Medicaid) and for federal employees.
Equal Access to Abortion Coverage (EACH) Act of 2021, S. 1021, 117th Cong.
§ 2. The bill also mandates that federally supported healthcare facilities
provide care for eligible individuals and prohibits the federal government from
inhibiting state, local or private insurance plans from covering abortion
services. Id. § 4.
367. Id.
368. See Upadhyay et al., supra note 9, at 1692 (finding that “[e]xpanding
the number of abortion facilities in underserved areas” would “reduce
out-of-pocket costs”).
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new Biden Administration, and in judicial decisions, given the
confirmation of Justice Barrett.369 But something equally
important is also happening. A new emphasis on public health
evidence has reinforced essential links among abortion access,
race, and class.370 Some evidence of this transformation can be
seen in events leading up to the FDA’s review of the restrictions
on medication abortion. One can already see the influence of
new regulatory contexts and new categories of supportive
evidence—even sometimes with respect to decisions of the
Supreme Court and in the factual records of district courts.371
The attention to the links between abortion access and
inequality has been supported by the work of political activists,
public health researchers, and practicing lawyers.372 Though not
blind to the obstacles and opposition ahead, this Article
endeavored to tell how those connections have been made visible
and why they can inspire legislative and community change.
The future of abortion discourse and practice is unclear, but, this
Article argues, abortion care will survive despite the decisions
of the Supreme Court and the formidable anti-abortion energies
of many states.

369. See Smith, supra note 351 (noting that the confirmation of Justice
Barrett creates uncertainty).
370. See Yearby, supra note 12, at 1284 (documenting that the “persistence
of racial bias” is “evident in the health care system”).
371. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
372. See supra note 359 and accompanying text.

